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THE WORLD IN OUR COURTSt
Stephen B. Burbank*
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LmGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS. By Gary B. Born with David Wes-

tin. Deventer/Boston: Kluwer Law & Taxation Publishers. 1989.
Pp. xxv, 736. $75.
I.

INTRODUCTION

International civil litigation shares with complex litigation, of
which it is often a part, 1 increasing practical importance and substantial theoretical interest. In their recently published and extremely valuable book on international civil litigation, Gary Born and David
Westin posit that U.S. courts have "begun to develop a distinct, cohesive body oflaw" (p. 1) and that there is an "emerging field of international civil litigation" (p. 3). Although the authors have organized the
book so as to treat nine topics in a way that "track[s] the course of
lawsuits involving foreign parties in U.S. courts,"2 they also identify
and trace the influence of five "common" or "basic themes that frequently recur in international civil litigation" (p. 3). These common
themes, in their minds, make international civil litigation a field rather
than a collection of topics.
This scheme of organization is felicitous, offering both detailed
treatment of the most important practical problems in international
civil litigation and recurrent opportunities to think about unifying
themes. The book is as much a treatise as it is a collection of materials
for course study, reflecting not only an extraordinary bibliographic
t
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- Ed. I am grateful for the comments and suggestions of Gary Born, Frank Goodman, Leo
Levin, Harold Maier, Jerome Marcus, Gerald Neuman, Linda Silberman, Stephen Subrin, and
my colleagues in the University of Pennsylvania Ad Hoc Seminar. All errors are theirs.
Just prior to publication of this review, the Supreme Court acted on the proposed amend·
ments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 and 26 that are criticized infra text accompanying
notes 161-200 and 228-40, declining to transmit them "at the present time pending further con·
sideration by the Court." Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Vice President Dan
Quayle (Apr. 30, 1991) (copy on file with author).
1. See Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463 (1987).
International civil litigation tends to be complex not so much because of party structure, but
because of the substantive or procedural issues involved. See infra text accompanying notes 1455 (legislative jurisdiction), 102-200 (service of process abroad), 201-40 (taking evidence abroad).
2. P. 2. The nine topics, treated in successive chapters, are Judicial Jurisdiction, Service of
Process Abroad, Forum Selection, Taking Evidence Abroad, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter and Legislative Jurisdiction, The Act of State Doctrine, Recognition and Enforce·
ment of Foreign Judgments, and International Arbitration.
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achievement3 but also the ambition of the authors, practitioner/scholars who, in the best tradition of international lawyers, have made numerous contributions to knowledge. 4 A!3 a result, International Civil
Litigation should quickly both stimulate and become the standard text
for courses in law schools, and it is an essential volume for the libraries
of firms involved in international practice. It is also a good place for
scholars interested in expanding their horizons, whether from a base in
domestic or in international law, to begin to think about problems at
the "crossroads." 5
A!3 one such scholar, whose base lies in the domestic law of procedure (including conflicts and evidence), I have found it fruitful, if not
necessary, to approach International Civil Litigation by considering
the roles of domestic analogies. Certainly, as the authors contemplated, this has proved a useful pedagogical strategy. Most students
come to the study of international litigation after learning the rules
governing domestic litigation. Even if only as a concession to the
shortness of life, initiates look for the familiar as a means to grasp the
unfamiliar, and domestic analogies can effectively stress continuities
and highlight discontinuities. In this case "students" includes many,
perhaps most, teachers and practitioners of international civil litigation, for whom the approach should also prove congenial. Finally, it is
a useful perspective from which to judge the authors' claim that there
is, or is about to be, a field here in the sense of a discretely identifiable
"law of international civil litigation" (p. 3), as well as to address the
implicit normative questions: should there be such a field and, if so,
what should it contain?
In pursuing these inquiries, I do not mean to question the utility of
the course of study offered in International Civil Litigation. On the
contrary, as I have already suggested, the authors' materials, including
their penetrating questions and textual analyses, make a compelling
case for the systematic study of the problems presented in litigation
that involves foreign parties. I am persuaded, in other words, that
international civil litigation is an area or field of law of what Michael
3. Particularly because many teachers, students, and practitioners using International Civil
Litigation for the first time may be unfamiliar with much of the vast literature cited by the
authors, a bibliography, organized by topic, would be useful. I would also recommend that the
next edition include a table of cases.
4. See, e.g., Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INTL.
& CoMP. L. 1 (1987); Westin & Born, Applying the Aerospatiale Decision in State Court Proceedings, 26 CoLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 297 (1988); Westin, Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judgments and Arbitral Awards in the United States, West Germany, and England, 19 LAW & POLY.
INTL. Bus. 325 (1987). Mr. Born also edits a newsletter for his firm, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. According to the first issue, it "will be distributed quarterly, free of charge, to lawyers and
others interested in U.S. litigation involving foreign parties or transactions." Editor's Introduc- •
tion, Intl. Litig. Newsletter, Feb. 1990, at 1. I have found the newsletter, "[t]he organizational
and analytical approach of [which] is modelled on" International Civil Litigation, very valuable.
5. See Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public
and Private International Law, 16 AM. J. INTL. L. 280 (1982).

Michigan Law Review

1458

[Vol. 89:1456

Moore calls a "nominal kind," 6 one that "can ... be justified by the
heuristic needs of the legal profession."7 I am interested in the question whether it is, as the authors seem to claim, more than that, and in
particular whether it is a field or area of "a functional kind." 8 Does
that which the authors call international civil litigation seek, in
Moore's words, "to realize some underlying kind of justice," 9 and if
not, should it do so? Ultimately, my hope is to shed light on that
which is, and that which could be, of special interest from the perspective of legal development, including both the applicable legal rules and
the appropriate sources of the rules, whatever their content.
II.

Is THERE A FIELD IN THIS CLASS?lO

The themes that the authors identify as recurring in international
civil litigation (pp. 3-18) are an amalgam of norms (public international law, international comity), structural concerns (international relations, federalism), and methodology (interest-balancing). Viewing
international relations as a subset of separation of powers, neither the
structural concerns nor the methodology is unique to international
cases, and the norms have domestic analogs. Indeed, our domestic
constitutional law of personal jurisdiction (full faith and credit and
due process) was shaped by, or at least explained in terms borrowed
from, international law. 11 Similarly, both the traditional choice oflaw
apparatus of Joseph Beale12 and the more modem techniques of Brainerd Currie13 bear evidence of international influences, in rules or approaches developed elsewhere or at home for international cases. In
other words, viewed in historical context, domestic conflict of laws has
6. Moore, A Theory of Criminal Law Theories. in TEL A VIV STUDIES IN LAW (D. Friedmann ed. 1991) (forthcoming).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. With apologies to Stanley Fish. See s. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE
AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE CoMMUNmES (1980).
11. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878); Trangsrud, The Federal Common
Law ofPersonal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 849, 871-80 (1989); Lilly, Jurisdiction our
Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REv. 85, 87, 124 (1983). The authors note Pennoyer's
reliance "on two related principles of public international law." P. 23.
12. For Beale's debts to the seventeenth-century Dutch jurist, Ulric Huber, and to the nineteenth-century English jurist, A.V. Dicey, as well as to Joseph Story, see Yntema, The Historic
Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. CoMP. L. 297, 306-08, 313-14 (1953). For recent
work on Huber, see Weinstein, The Dutch Influence on the Conception ofJudicial Jurisdiction in
19th Century America, 38 AM. J. CoMP. L. 73 (1990).
13. Currie conceived of choice of law as a process of statutory construction or interpretation.
He found support, and perhaps inspiration, in the work of Lord Karnes of Scotland. See B.
CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 379 (1963). Moreover, Currie's thinking was influenced by the Supreme Court's decision in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953),
involving the application of the Jones Act to a Danish seaman injured on board a Danish ship
while in Havana harbor. See B. CURRIE, supra, at 364-75, 379, 434-35, 604-06, 631.
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been responsive to international as well as domestic influences and, to
that extent at least, international litigation has not been a discrete
field.
Nor am I persuaded that international civil litigation is a discrete
field today. It seems more accurate to view international civil litigation as part of a process of cross-fertilization in which (1) doctrine and
techniques developed in the context of domestic cases are brought to
bear on problems presented in international litigation, and (2) the increasingly international dimensions of litigation in our courts prompt
changes in doctrine and techniques, which are then applied in domestic cases.
A. Domestic to International
As one example of a problem in international civil litigation on
which our courts have brought to bear doctrine and techniques developed in domestic cases, 14 consider legislative, or as it is sometimes
called, prescriptive jurisdiction (pp. 432-88). For one fresh to the
study of international litigation from domestic law, the concept of "the
authority of a state to make its substantive laws applicable to conduct,
relationships or status" (p. 432) may be difficult to grasp. Our tendency to frame issues of lawmaking power in terms of individual rights
pushes into the background concerns about sovereign prerogatives
that inform the concept of legislative jurisdiction and place it at the
crossroads of public and private international law.
In mining domestic analogs, vertical (federal-state) thinking conjures up questions about the extent of federal legislative power, potential or exercised, as against the powers of the states. Yet, meaningful
limitations on Congress' potential legislative powers are hard to find
today. 15 Moreover, domt>..stic questions about the extent of exercised
federal legislative power tend to be submerged in careless talk about
subject matter jurisdiction, in part reflecting our constitutional history, 16 that invites confusion as between legislative and judicial pow14. That the doctrine and techniques have been developed in domestic cases does not mean
that they originated here, as the history recounted here demonstrates. Rather, we see a process
in which conflicts doctrine and techniques imported from abroad and refined and applied in
domestic cases, are then applied in international cases, with additional domestic refinements similarly extending their influence.
15. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding
the application of federal overtime and minimum wage requirements to state employees); Ely,
The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 700-06 (1974).
16. See REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES§ 401 comment c (1987); Lowenfeld, Antitrust, Interest Analysis, and the New Conflict of
Laws (Book Review), 95 HARV. L. REv. 1976, 1979 (1982) ("the idea of 'subject matter jurisdiction' is a misplaced relic from the constitutional battles of the 1920's and 1930's"); Comment,
Sherman Act "Jurisdiction" in Hospital Staff Exclusion Cases, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 121 (1983).
To their credit, the authors are alert to such confusion. See p. 404.
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ers.17 Confusion on that score is also promoted by the Supreme
Court's approach to filling federal legislative gaps with judge-made
law.1s
Horizontal (state-state) thinking is not likely to be much more
helpful in a search for domestic guidance on the problem of legislative
jurisdiction in international cases, although the analogy is closer.
Conflicts students know that state legislatures rarely address questions
of power by providing choice of law rules or otherwise indicating the
intended reach of the norms they establish. 19 They also know or
should know that, when framed in terms of legislative intent, interest
analysis is usually an exercise in fiction. 20 The result has been that the
closest thing to legislative jurisdiction upon which such students can
fasten are domestic constitutional limitations on the application of
state law. Here too, the search for meaningful limitations is largely an
exercise in history.21
Still, approaching the problem of legislative jurisdiction in international cases from a domestic perspective has some value. Once attention is focused on the appropriate analogs, it becomes clear that the
uniform tendency of our domestic law has been toward the loosening
of mandatory controls on the exercise of lawmaking power, federal
and (inter-) state, with the result that meaningful limitations at both
levels are the result of self-restraint. In that process, courts have
played a prominent role, if only by default.
The same has been true, I believe, in international cases in our
courts when the question has been whether there is legislative jurisdic17. Professor Brilmayer observes "that [because of the 'public law taboo'] in those cases
where the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law (but not the Restatement of Conflicts) applies,
lack oflegislative jurisdiction entails lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Brilmayer, The Extra-

territorial Application ofAmerican Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, SO LAW
& CoNTEMP. PROBS. (No. 3), 11, 13 (1987) (footnote omitted). She adds: "In a case brought in
federal court, adjudicative jurisdiction will typically depend upon whether there is a federal question, which in tum depends on whether there is local legislative jurisdiction. If foreign law governs, the case must be dismissed." Id. This is not helpful. See, e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
681-82 (1946) ("where the complaint ... is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal court, but for two possible exceptions later
noted, must entertain the suit").

18. See Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common
Law: A General Approach, 71 CoRNELL L. REv. 733, 755-62 (1986). As pointed out there, the
Court too often has "leap[ed] from a conclusion of federal power to one of judicial power," id. at
758 (footnote omitted), and, although in recent years it has been more reluctant to apply uniform
federal rules in preference to state law adopted as federal law, the Court has treated the matter as
one of ''.judicial grace or borrowing," id. at 762, when in fact the process is governed by the Rules
of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). See infra note 126.
19. See, e.g., B. CuRRIE, supra note 13, at 81-82.
20. See Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth ofLegislative Intent, 78 MICH. L. REV. 392
(1980).
21. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). But see Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 814-23 (1985) (application of Kansas laws to every claim in nationwide
class action unconstitutional).
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tion. Perhaps a reason is that domestic experience and influences have
long shaped, and continue to shape, our responses to such questions.
Professor Lowenfeld22 has noted the reference to conflict oflaws in
Judge Hand's opinion in the Alcoa case,23 which ushered in the concept of "effects" jurisdiction in international antitrust cases (pp. 43738, 442-43). He also pointed out that in the 1909 American Banana
decision,24 Justice Holmes made reference to a domestic conflicts classic.25 If domestic conflicts thinking "changed a good deal [between]
the Alcoa case"26 and the time Professor Lowenfeld was writing, even
greater changes had occurred since 1909. The one constant has been
resort to domestic law for rules and techniques that may also serve in
international cases.
Professor Lowenfeld is a champion of cross-fertilization, and the
assimilative views he expressed in his 1979 Hague Lectures27 proved
highly influential in the formulation of the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 28 The Restatement's provisions on prescriptive jurisdiction, in particular section 403, 29 bring to
22. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International Law,
and Some Suggestions far their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES CouRS 311, 380-81 (1979).
23. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
24. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
25. In a reference usually omitted in editions of the American Banana case for antitrust or
international law purposes, Justice Holmes continues "This principle was carried to an extreme in Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878)." In that case, as all students of American
conflict of laws cases will remember, a Massachusetts lady was deprived of the defense of a
Massachusetts rule prohibiting married women from guaranteeing their husbands' debts, on
the ground that her guarantee had been mailed from Massachusetts to Maine and had only
there become effective upon receipt by the lender and execution of the contract that gave rise
to the debt.
Lowenfeld, supra note 22, at 435 n.119; see American Banana, 213 U.S. at 356. The Court also
referred to A.V. Dicey's treatise on conflicts. A.V. DICEY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1908);
see 213 U.S. at 356. International Civil Litigation discusses American Banana at pp. 435-36.
26. Lowenfeld, supra note 22, at 381.
27. Lowenfeld, supra note 22.
28. See id. at 364; see also Lowenfeld, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and Reasonableness: A Reply
to A. V. Lawe, 15 AM. J. INTL. L. 629, 637-38 (1981). Professor Lowenfeld was an Associate
Reporter for this effort. 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES v (1987).
29. § 403. Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections
with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is determined
by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which
the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable
effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or
between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to ~he regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to
which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
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bear on the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction the full panoply of
techniques, from the consideration of contacts30 to the evaluation of
interests,3 I that have been used to dissolve and resolve domestic choice
of law problems. 32 Not surprisingly, those provisions have been the
object of many of the same criticisms with which modern choice of
law approaches are taxed, including unmanageability and unpredictability, lack of institutional capacity and expertise, and parochial
bias. 33
Just as domestic rules of constitutional law today provide few
checks on federal legislative power vis-a-vis the states or on state legislative power vis-a-vis other states,34 so do rules of international law
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international
system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
(3) When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdiction over a
person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in conflict, each state has an
obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in
light of all the relevant factors, Subsection (2); a state should defer to the other state if that
state's interest is clearly greater.
RE.sl'ATEMENT (THIRD) OF TIIE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIIE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987). Section 402 provides:
§ 402. Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(l)(a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within
its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its
territory; and
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against
the security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.
Id. at § 402. Both sections are discussed at pp. 459-65.
For illustration of the principles set forth in §§ 402-03 in specific substantive contexts, see
§§ 411-13 (tax); § 414 (foreign subsidiaries); § 415 (antitrust); and § 416 (securities regulation).
See also § 441 (foreign government compulsion); § 442 (transnational discovery).
30. See REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF TIIE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIIE UNITED
STATES§ 403(2)(a), (b).
31. See REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF TIIE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIIB UNITED
STATES § 403(2)(c), (e), (g).
32. See Maier, supra note 5, at 286-87. Section 403(2) can be seen as a means to discover
false conflicts, with § 403(3) providing the method for resolving true conflicts. See Meessen,
Conflicts ofJurisdiction Under the New Restatement, 50 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRODS. (No. 3), 47,
68-69 (1987). For the domestic analogs, see, e.g., B. CuRRIB, supra note 13, at 177-87.
33. Pp. 461-65. For a sampling of domestic critiques of interest analysis to the same effect,
see R. CRAM'TON, D. CuRRIE & H. KAY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS 230-34 (4th ed. 1987). For work
that ties the critiques together, see Brilmayer, supra note 17.
34. The extent to which the Constitution protects foreigners in our courts is a subject that
may warrant additional attention from the authors in the next edition. They note that the Court
has "assumed that the due process clause [is] fully applicable to the assertion of [personal] jurisdiction over foreigners ..•." P. 67. But constitutional limitations may be relevant to other
topics treated in International Civil Litigation, including legislative jurisdiction. See Brilmayer,
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only weakly constrain extraterritorial assertions of legislative jurisdiction. Indeed, Congress can constitutionally disregard rules of international law in passing legislation for application to conduct or
transactions with contacts outside of the United States (p. 443), and
there is no international tribunal empowered to check its excesses. 35
As a result, the problems of authority in the domestic and international contexts are alike primarily because, and to the extent that,
Congress fails to specify the territorial reach of federal legislation.
For a time, traditional territorial conflicts rules and twin presumptions against extraterritorial application and interpretations that
would violate international law (p. 434) -American Banana may reflect all three36 - operated to put the brakes on extraterritorial applications of U.S. law. But, as we have seen, domestic conflicts thinking
changed, and the presumption against extraterritorial application may
be hard to justify in connection with statutes explicitly directed to
"foreign commerce." 37 Today such a presumption is difficult to justify
at all, 38 which may be one reason why so much effort has been devoted
to invigorating its twin presumption. The focus of the effort has been
to establish that the jurisdictional "rule of reason" of section 403 (pp.
459-65) is a rule of customary international law.
When, as is usually the case, Congress has failed to specify whether
or to what extent a statute applies to conduct or transactions having
extraterritorial links, it falls to the courts to "interpret" the statute.
Left to their own devices, U.S. courts predictably, but not invariably
(pp. 462-63), choose an interpretation of the statute that advances its
policies over one that frustrates those policies or subordinates them to
the policies of another country. The devices that lead to such behavior
are not confined to knee-jerk parochialism. Brainerd Currie's interest
analysis proceeded on the premise that courts in a democratic society
supra note 17, at 24-35; Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction. 18 CoLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1592, 1598-99
(1978). But see Juenger, Constitutional Control of Extraterritoriality?: A Comment on Professor
Brilmayer's Appraisal, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 39, 41 (domestic experience
with constitutional control of state court jurisdiction and state choice of law do not inspire confidence about "the Court's ability to fashion principles that would resolve problems created by the
overlap of domestic and foreign legislation .••.").
35. See Oxman, The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention. 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 733, 744-45
(1983).
36. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909). International Civil Litigation quotes from this portion of the opinion at p. 436.
37. See Wood, International Jurisdiction in National Legal Systems: The Case of Antitrust,
10 Nw. J. INTL. L. & Bus. 56, 58, 72 (1989).
38. See Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598 (1990). But see Wood, supra note 37, at 72 (advocating presumption against extraterritorial effect). The Supreme Court has recently declined an
opportunity to break down distinctions, decried by Professor Turley, between the extraterritorial
reach of market and nonmarket legislation. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227
(1991) (Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act not applicable to U.S. citizen employed abroad by U.S.
employer).
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should not balance the interests of two or more sovereign states, 39 and,
in response to his critics, the most that Currie would allow was "room
for restraint and enlightenment in the determination of what state policy is and where state interests lie." 40 Those who reject Currie's proposed solution to true conflicts (the law of an interested forum applies)
are necessarily engaging, through a variety of techniques, 41 in what
might be called interstate comity.
Some courts and commentators see in section 403 nothing more
than international comity (p. 461), what Professor Lowenfeld has
called "unilateral interest analysis, although tempered by statesmanship. "42 It was Lowenfeld's hope that the section would state a rule of
international law. 43 If it did, 44 the presumption against interpreting a
statute so as to bring it in conflict with international law would provide U.S. courts with a principled basis45 upon which to refuse to apply domestic legislation that did not specify its reach to conduct or
transactions the regulation of which would serve the statute's policies.
My conditional specifies a "principled basis" rather than a "principled
method." Because status as customary international law requires
"consistent practice of states followed out of a sense of legal obligation" (p. 13), variations in practices regarding the exercise of judicial
discretion can defeat claims to such status,46 one of many reasons why
39. See B. CuRRIE, supra note 13, at 182.
40. Id. at 186; see also id. at 604.
41. See, e.g., R. CRAMTON, D. CuRRIE & H. KAY, supra note 33, at 241-46.
42. Lowenfeld, supra note 16, at 1984.
43. See id. at 1980-84; Lowenfeld, supra note 28, at 638; see also Maier, supra note 5, at 28185 (distinguishing two meanings of comity).
44. Section 403 had a stormy history in the deliberative processes of the American Law
Institute. See Kessedjian, Le Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Un
Nouveau Traite de Droit International?, J. DU DROIT INTL., Jan.-Mar. 1990, at 56-58; Maier, The
Authoritative Sources of Customary International Law in the United States, 10 MICH. J. INTL. L.
450, 465-68 (1989). The "principle of reasonableness" in the exercise of legislative jurisdiction is
said to be "a rule of international law." REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 403 comment a (1987). No such statement is made in connection with § 403(3), involving conflicting exercises of jurisdiction, the result of disagreement on
the point among members of the Institute. See Kessedjian, supra, at 62 n.104; Maier, supra, at
468.
45. This is a rule of legislative construction whose purpose is to ensure that courts do not
accidentally, by exercising the judicial power, put the United States in violation of its international obligations when that result was not intended by the political branches. Under this
rule of construction, however, the court's search of international authorities is carried out to
serve the domestic constitutional principle of separation of powers, not to give effect to
substantive international community policy for its own sake.
Maier, supra note 44, at 454-55 n.12; see id. at 466.
46. See Gerber, Beyond Balancing: Intemationa/ Law Restraints on the Reach of National
Laws, 10 YALE J. INTL. L. 185, 208 (1984); cf Reinsurance Co. of Am., Inc. v. Administratia
Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1283 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (criticizing REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 442
because "a court's job is to reach judgments on the basis of rules of law rather than to use a
different recipe for each meal.").
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commentators deny it to section 403's provisions.47
The aspirations and claims of the authors of the Restatement
notwithstanding, the problem of legislative jurisdiction in international cases is, like its analogs in domestic law, chiefly one of selfrestraint. 48 Whatever the force of political theory in favor of forum
law in interstate cases,49 we should take very seriously concerns about
refusals to apply U.S. law (the policies of which would be served by its
application) when they implicate this nation's interests in foreign policy or foreign trade. 50 Those who advocate a dichotomy between subject matter jurisdiction (what Congress intended) and prescriptive
J1nisdiction (what international law permits) broaden the scope of a
domestic error. 51 "Subject matter jurisdiction" is not the question, 52
and the question of legislative jurisdiction is always one of statutory
construction or, depending on where one draws the line between interpretation and supplementation, of federal common law. 53 In approaching that task, courts should be alert not only to the limited role
of customary international law, but also to limitations on their role
and competence and to the very real risk that "[j]udicial application of
a restraint doctrine could ... undercut attempts by the Executive to
negotiate compromises over jurisdictional conflicts ...." 54 In many
cases, the real problems are not those of legislative jurisdiction; they
47. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 46; Meessen, supra note 32, at 59; Trimble, A Revisionist
View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. REv. 665, 704-05 (1986); Comment, Antitrust Suits Involving Foreign Commerce.· Suggestions for Procedural Reform, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1003, 1031 (1987). For similar views on the Restatement's provisions regarding antitrust and
securities transactions, see Meessen, supra note 32, at 54.
48. Cf. Oxman, supra note 35, at 747-48 (principles of self-restraint flowing from "absence of
outside judicial control" and inability of courts to perform "negotiating and political functions").
49. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40. The influence that legislative jurisdiction cases
with international elements had on Brainerd Currie's thinking about domestic choice of law, see
supra note 13, may in fact have made him more sensitive to such matters.
50. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-51 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (reprinted at pp. 463-64).
51. But see Turley, supra note 38, at 635-36 (making such a dichotomy).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
53. See Brilmayer, supra note 17, at 35-36; Maier, supra note 44, at 464-76.
54. Trimble, supra note 47, at 706. Conversely, "[d]ecisions by national courts that purport
to recognize foreign governmental interests while in fact adopting a parochial analysis do a
greater disservice to the international system than would a straightforward approach that gives
primacy to forum interests subject to international dispute resolution in the diplomatic forum at
a later time." Maier, Interest Balancing and International Jurisdiction. 31 AM. J. CoMP. L. 579,
594-95 (1983).
By "the limited role of customary international law," I mean primarily to refer to the scope
of existing rules, acknowledged as such by the international community. I am also inclined,
however, to agree with Professor Maier that customary international law is not itself an authoritative source of law. See Maier, supra note 44, passim; infra text accompanying notes 242-46.
But see, e.g., R.EsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES ch. 2 Introductory Note (1987) ("customary international law •.. is a kind of federal
law"); Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1566
(1984) (customary law is "self-executing").
In any event, there is scope for "restraint and enlightenment in the determination of what
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are problems involving disagreement on matters of substantive law
and state policy.ss
Having covered the history and current practice of legislative jurisdiction in broad scope and admirable detail, the authors of International Civil Litigation ask whether section "403's interest-balancing [is]
any different from many approaches in the conflict oflaws context" (p.
462). I have suggested a negative answer to that question, one that
ultimately turns on the role and content of international law in this
context. That the techniques should be so similar is no surprise given
the provenance of section 403, and both the similarities and the lineage
are evidence against the notion that legislative jurisdiction in international cases is part of a discrete field. At the same time, however, the
similarities should not obscure the distinctive attributes of international cases that may call for special deference to choices made, or that
might be made, by the political branches.
B. International to Domestic
To the extent that international cases in our courts raise questions
of procedure, it would be surprising if they were treated differently
than domestic cases. For the tendency of the modern federal law of
procedure, whether created in court rules or in cases, has been toward
uniform, transsubstantive rules that apply to all cases in all federal
courts. s6 To be sure, today the rules are often only formally uniform
and transsubstantive, and the whole notion is, as a normative matter,
increasingly subject to attack. s7 But the pull toward applying the
same rule to different substantive contexts has been so strong that substantive concerns originally animating a rule are forgotten, ss and attempts to carve out an exception in a particular substantive context
are vigorously resisted. s9 Moreover, some of the most prominent dostate policy is and where state interests lie." B. CURRIE, supra note 13, at 186, quoted supra text
accompanying note 40; see Maier, supra note 5, at 315.
55. See Juenger, supra note 34, at 46; Wood, supra note 37, at 73-74.
56. See, e.g., Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of
Rule 11. 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1929-41 (1989).
57. See id.; Burbank, supra note 1, at 1473-75; Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The
Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 713-19 (1988);
Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2018-26 (1989).
58. Thus, although the abrogation of mutuality of estoppel in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc. v. University oflllinois Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), resulted from a consideration of both
the policies of the patent law and considerations of efficiency, 402 U.S. at 328-50, nonmutual
issue preclusion quickly became the rule in federal preclusion law. The same is true of the rule in
United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), regarding the preclusive effect
of administrative factfinding.
59. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 268-69 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (imputing to the Court a special summary judgment rule in libel cases); Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) ("We ..• reject the suggestion that First Amendment concerns
enter into the jurisdictional analysis"); see also infra text accompanying note 223 (presumption
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mestic examples involve rules that are "procedural" only if that label
is expansively applied, including constitutional rules regarding the
limits of state court jurisdiction. 60 Those rules have also provided an
opportunity for generalization to operate between international and
domestic cases. But they are not the only examples of cross-fertilization from international to domestic cases, of adjusting the rules of the
game for a larger playing field rather than playing by different rules.
1. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate
The authors of International Civil Litigation treat judicial jurisdiction exhaustively, perhaps too much so. 61 Most undergraduate law
students will have covered the territory thoroughly in their first year.
For them, the important thing is to see how, if at all, the involvement
of foreign parties changes the analysis. 62 Graduate law students and
practicing lawyers may be differently situated; however, the authors
provide a good deal of textual introduction, which can be supplemented by lecture for students and by other texts for lawyers.
The authors' textual material, although typically helpful and thorough, might be improved in two respects. First, the discussion of Rule
4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should note potential distinctions between standards of amenability (jurisdiction) when service can
be made within the state, and there may therefore be scope for a federal standard in federal question cases, and when it must be made
outside the state under Rule 4(e). 63 Second, the authors may give insufficient attention to the intense debate about the respective roles of
territoriality or federalism on the one hand, and of reasonableness on
the other, in constitutional limitations on state court jurisdiction.64
that a subsequently enacted federal statute does not displace the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
60. See supra notes 58-59.
61. Chapter 2, treating judicial jurisdiction, occupies 100 pages (pp. 19-118) in a book that,
absent appendices, etc., is 646 pages long. Apart from the considerations mentioned in the text,
experience indicates that, for a two-hour, one-term course, that is too much.
62. Even though most law students and litigators are likely to be familiar with Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the attention the authors devote to in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction (pp. 90-103) is wholly appropriate because of the importance of securing property to
satisfy a judgment. The authors were also wise in treating in some detail jurisdiction based on
corporate affiliations or agency (pp. 104-17), a subject that may be neglected in domestic procedure courses. Indeed, those materials provide an excellent opportunity to explore an important
question in jurisdictional jurisprudence, to wit, the extent to which a firm should be able to
structure its business so as to insulate itself from suit. This question is of particular importance
in the international context, where the constellation of laws and practices that an assertion of
jurisdiction may entail can raise the stakes dramatically. Judge Breitel's dissenting opinion in
Frummer (reprinted at pp. 114-15) gives a sense of the risks. For a penetrating analysis of the
problems, see Brilmayer & Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1986).
63. See pp. 70-73; see also Lilly, supra note 11, at 137-38. But see id. at 138-39 (noting
possibility of a federal amenability standard when service is made under Rule 4(d)(3)).
64. Pp. 48-49, 54-55. Perhaps as a result, the authors seem inappropriately agnostic on the
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This debate has been directly fueled by Supreme Court opinions that
sound now one theme and then the other, and it will surely continue to
rage in the wake of the Burnham case, 65 upholding general jurisdiction
based on the transitory presence of the defendant when served with
process in the forum (pp. 35-42). It is, of course, a debate to which
undergraduate law students at any good school will have been exposed
in other courses. Yet, an international perspective may help to illuminate it. 66 More important for present purposes, attention to the debate
and to the cases that have fueled it calls into question the authors'
claim that the Court's 1987 decision in the Asahi case67 represented a
"modif[ication of] domestic due process formulations in international
cases" (p. 56), if by that claim they mean that different "due process
formulations" are now applied in international and domestic cases.
The holding in Asahi, where the Court denied California's power
to adjudicate an indemnity claim by a defendant against one of its
component part manufacturers, will probably have limited significance
because of its unusual facts, in particular the facts that the party invoking the court's jurisdiction was a Taiwanese corporation, that the
claim involved was probably governed by foreign law, and that the
putative party resisting jurisdiction was also a foreign corporation. 68
But the mode of constitutional analysis used to reach that holding was
not intended to be, and has not been, restricted to international cases.
Beginning in 1977, when after a twenty-year hiatus the Court
again became interested in federal constitutional control of state court
question whether, when a national amenability standard is prescribed or authorized, reasonableness plays a part in the fifth amendment analysis. See p. 77. But see Carrington, Continuing
Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 733, 742 (1988) ("It seems
also likely that the fifth amendment prevents a forum selection that is so unreasonably inconvenient to the defendant as to be a denial of 'fair play and substantial justice.' ") (footnote omitted).
One should distinguish between international law and the Constitution in deciding whether it
makes a difference where in this country an internationally foreign defendant is sued. But see
Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 1985); p. 39.
65. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990); see infra text accompanying
note 106; note 107.
66. In addition to promoting an understanding of international influences that shaped the
history of territoriality, see supra text accompanying note 11, such a perspective would also provide a basis for evaluating continuing reliance on transient jurisdiction in light of developments
abroad. See REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 421 comment e (1987); id. at Reporters' Note 5. There is irony in the fact that a rule
once justified in terms of principles of international law "is no longer acceptable under international law if [presence] is the only basis for jurisdiction and the action in question is unrelated to
the state.'' Id.; see also Hay, Transient Jurisdiction, Especially Over International Defendants:
Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593, 599·
601.
67. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The case is
excerpted and discussed at pp. 61-69.
68. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114-15. For international cases sustaining the exercise of jurisdiction after Asahi, see, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911
(9th Cir. 1990); Mason v. F. LLi Luigi & Franco da1 Maschio Fu G.B., 832 F.2d 383 (7th Cir.
1987).
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jurisdiction,69 Justice Brennan had been trying to broaden the due process inquiry so that the attention paid to defendants did not pretermit
consideration of the interests of plaintiffs or of the forums in which
they sued. 70 Although the majorities in those cases paid lip service to
the factors stressed by Brennan,71 in fact they decided the cases on the
basis of an inquiry into the contacts among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation.72 As a result, the Court seemed unlikely to reverse
an exercise of jurisdiction in which minimum contacts (narrowly
viewed) were found to exist or, conversely, to sustain an exercise of
jurisdiction in which minimum contacts (narrowly viewed) were lacking. 73 Moreover, the Court's cases provided little basis for formulating a sliding scale of minimum contacts.74
Against this background, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 75 gave
Justice Brennan an opportunity to write his views into an opinion for
the Court, if not yet into law. Although that opinion acknowledged
that "the constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant
purposefully established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State," 76 it
went on to state that "these contacts may be considered in light of
other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.' " 77 Moreover, the Court's opinion asserted that the same factors "sometimes
serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required. " 78
Asahi made law out of Burger King's dicta, but the law made was
hard to discern. Given his conclusion that there were minimum contacts in Asahi, Justice Brennan (joined by three others) thought that
"[t]his is one of those rare cases in which 'minimum requirements in69. The hiatus was from Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), to Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977).
70. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299-313 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219-28 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Note, Burger King v. Rudzewicz: Flexibility and Predictability in In Personam Jurisdiction, 64 N.C. L. REV. 880 (1986); see also infra note 85 and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Kulko v.
Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
72. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294; see also Shaffer. 433 U.S. at 204; Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
73. See Lilly, supra note 11, at 107.
74. A possible exception to this generalization is Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770 (1984). There, however, the Court (per Rehnquist, J.) was responding to the analysis of the
Court of Appeals. See 465 U.S. at 773-81. In any event, Justice Brennan capitalized on the
Court's opinion in Keeton when it came time for him to write for the Court in Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). See 471 U.S. at 473-77.
75. 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (reprinted at pp. 50-54).
76. 471 U.S. at 474 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)).
77. 471 U.S. at 476 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).
78. 471 U.S. at 477; see supra note 74.
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herent in the concept of "fair play and substantial justice" ... defeat
the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities.' " 79 But three members of the
Court (including two who also joined Justice Brennan's opinion), led
by Justice Stevens, expressed the view that "[a]n examination of minimum contacts is not always necessary to determine whether a state
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitutional." 80 Moreover, that part of Justice O'Connor's opinion that commanded a majority deployed a multifactored analysis in which the place of
minimum contacts was not at all clear. 81
The worries arising from this cacophony were, at least for me, that
(1) state (and federal) courts would discard minimum contacts analysis altogether, and (2) they would regard Asahi as an invitation to assert jurisdiction in the absence of minimum contacts (narrowly
viewed). Neither development would, in my opinion, have been desirable. Minimum contacts is hardly a talisman, but, as developed and
refined in recent years, the test has imparted some measure of predictability to an area of law where it is very important (p. 56). Moreover,
the requirement of minimum contacts has served as a bulwark against
states seeking not just to adjudicate but to apply forum law. 82 Happily, the lower courts have not regarded Asahi as an invitation to abandon minimum contacts, but they have recognized that it is authority to
consider something more. s3
Asahi was an international case, and its international dimensions
79. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78).
80. 480 U.S. at 121-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("[T]his case fits within the rule that 'minimum requirements inherent in the concept of "fair
play and substantial justice" may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant
has purposefully engaged in forum activities.'" (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477-78)).
81. See 480 U.S. at 113-16. The only reference to minimum contacts in Part 11.B of Justice
O'Connor's opinion, which was joined by all members of the Court except Justice Scalia, occurs
in a sentence asserting that "[w]hen minimum contacts have been established, often the interests
of the plaintiff and the forum in the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens
placed on the alien defendant." 480 U.S. at 114. It is likely, however, that references to other
decisions giving primacy to minimum contacts, see 480 U.S. at 112-13, reflect the belief that it
remains "the constitutional touchstone." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. See infra note 86.
82. See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 325 n.8 (1980). The costs of a free-form due
process inquiry would not be confined to litigants. The Supreme Court would be called on to
clean up the mess it had created. When it did so, I expect we would find a majority of the Court
reasserting the primacy of minimum contacts analysis and making it clear that multifactored
analysis is a one-way street, available to strike down an exercise of jurisdiction where the minimum contacts inquiry is indeterminate but not to bless jurisdiction where minimum contacts
(narrowly viewed) are lacking. This seems to have been Justice Stevens' position in Asahi. See
supra note 80. If not, the Court would soon find it necessary to revisit the question of federal
constitutional control of state choice of law. Cf. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an
Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33, 97-98 (1978) (if forum law - then jurisdiction preference would
require more adequate policing of choice of law).
83. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 87.
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properly influenced the outcome. 84 But the case provided a vehicle for
the reascension of a mode of constitutional analysis that had been repudiated in deeds if not in words. 85 The "modification" it initiated is
not one that-judging from the opinions86 - the Justices embracing
it intended for application only in international cases, and it has not
been so restricted in the lower courts in the years since the case was
decided.87
2. Arbitration

The perceived pressures of their dockets sooner or later would
have caused the federal courts to reexamine rules that sought to protect their jurisdiction from efforts either to avoid judicial dispute resolution or to ensure that, if it was necessary, litigation proceed in a
forum or forums agreed to in advance. In the case of agreements to
arbitrate (pp. 605-46), Congress long ago set itself against the traditional judicial hostility. The potential of the Federal Arbitration Act88
to override that hostility, however - particularly in state courts and
state law cases in federal court - was not quickly realized. 89 More84. See supra text accompanying note 68; see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 ("Considering the
international context, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the
plaintiff and the forum State, the exercise of personal jurisdiction ••. in this instance would be
unreasonable and unfair.").
The same may be true of the only two modem Supreme Court decisions that have involved
assertions of general jurisdiction over corporations. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (reprinted and discussed at pp. 29-35); Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining, 342 U.S. 437 (1952). In neither case, however, did the Court suggest that a different
mode of analysis applied in wholly domestic cases.
85. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan can be seen as merely
taking over for Justice Black, who wrote a multifactored opinion for the Court in McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and whose dissent in Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 256-62 (1958) (Black, J. dissenting), he joined.
86. Note in particular the heavy reliance on Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985),
a domestic case, in the two concurring opinions. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
Note also the following passage in Part 11.B of Justice O'Connor's opinion (joined by all other
Justices except Justice Scalia):
We have previously explained that the determination of the reasonableness of the exercise of
jurisdiction in each case will depend on an evaluation of several factors. A court must
consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintifi's
interest in obtaining relief. It must also weigh in its determination "the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (citations omitted).
480 U.S. at 113.
87. See, e.g., WNS, Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989); Interfirst Bank Clifton
v. Fernandez, 844 F.2d 279, 284-85 (5th Cir. 1988); Morris v. SSE, Inc., 843 F.2d 489, 494-95
(11th Cir. 1988).
Prior to Asahi, Professor Lilly criticized the tendency of our courts to treat international
cases as if they were domestic for purposes of jurisdiction, but his point was that such treatment
could lead to a "complete failure of domestic jurisdiction." Lilly, supra note 11, at 125. Asahi
may have exacerbated that problem. See Weintraub, Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction Down the
Tubes, 23 TEXAS INTL. L.J. SS (1988).
88. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988). Seep. 618.
89. See Shell, The Role ofPublic Law in Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on Shearson/
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over, even in cases to which the Act was unquestionably applicable,
the federal courts carved out exceptions in particular substantive
contexts. 90
International cases furnished occasions to reconsider the exceptions to the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate,91 and in those
cases the Court placed weight on "concerns of international comity,
respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes." 92 The authors of International Civil Litigation observe:
After Mitsubishi, the characterization of a contract as "international,"
rather than domestic, may be of importance in determining the arbitrability of at least some types of statutory claims, although recent
Supreme Court decisions illustrate a readiness to enforce most arbitration agreements, even in the purely domestic context . . . . [p. 630]
In fact, the McMahon case, 93 cited by the authors, suggests that inter-

national elements no longer have much salience when the question is
arbitration, and I wonder whether they ever really did. 94 We see the
same progression - indeed, the one influenced the other - in cases
involving the enforceability of contractual forum selection clauses (pp.
172-208), with an international case, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 95 providing a vehicle for a change in the law that has been extended to domestic cases (p. 177).
International cases in our courts may present occasions for the application of rules of law that are not pertinent in wholly domestic
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 397, 401 (1988). For subsequent developments, federalizing the law of arbitration agreements subject to the Act, see Perry v. Thomas,
482 U.S. 483 (1987); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983); ffirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71
VA. L. R.Ev. 1305 (1985). But see Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Stanford Univ., 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989) (state statutory provision permitting stay of arbitration applicable pursuant to choice of law clause).
90. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (claims under Securities Act of 1933 nonarbitrable); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968)
(federal antitrust claims nonarbitrable); Shell, supra note 89, at 402-04.
91. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (federal antitrust claims arbitrable in international business context); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506 (1974) (claims under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 arbitrable in international
business context).
92. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629, quoted at p. 629; see also Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-19.
93. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (claims under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO arbitrable in domestic business context).
94. See 482 U.S. at 229, 232, 239-41; Shell, supra note 89, at 409; see also Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989) (holding claims under Securities Act of 1933 arbitrable, thus overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
95. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The Court relied on Bremen in both Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518-19, and
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629-31. For a prediction that the rule in Bremen would be extended, see
Maier, The Three Faces o/Zapata: Maritime Law, Federal Common Law, Federal Courts Law, 6
VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 387, 397-98 (1973).
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cases. Act of state96 and foreign sovereign immunity (pp. 335-402) are
two prominent examples. Yet, as the authors of International Civil
Litigation recognize, even in these areas the rules have not been immune to domestic influences.97 In any event, a few pockets of doctrine
do not make a field of "a functional kind," 98 although their existence
enhances the value of materials designed to serve the needs of the legal
profession.

III.

SHOULD THERE BE A FIELD IN THIS CLASS?

All of this begs the normative questions whether, apart from what
the courts and the American Law Institute have done or are doing,
international civil litigation should be a field and what it should contain. As I have already suggested,99 the answers to those questions
may depend on the part that international law can and should usefully
96. Pp. 489-560. Although typically careful to expose nooks and crannies, these materials
suffer from oversimplification and, at the same time, overcomplication. The former problem
results from the authors' attempt to portray the act of state doctrine as a "principle of judicial
abstention." P. 489; see also pp. 491, 493, 503, 506. But see p. 508. The latter results from a
reading ofBanco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (reprinted at pp. 493-508)
that, as the authors recognize (seep. 514), is not compelled. Both reflect a commendable desire
to fit this chaos into the broader field that the authors have identified, if only through the identification of themes.
If, as is usual, the act of state doctrine prevents a court from adjudicating a claim brought by
a plaintiff, it may be appropriate to label the doctrine one of judicial abstention, although even
then, one should attend to the nature and form of the judgment entered, as well as to its preclusive consequences. But, as the authors well know, the doctrine also operates to defeat defenses,
and in that context abstention hardly seems an adequate description. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
438 (reprinted at p. 501).
The authors' reading of Sabbatino as reflecting "a more flexible doctrine of abstention, apparently calling for case-by-case consideration of a variety of factors" (p. 491) is supported by a
quotation wrenched from context. In any event, that reading seems to confuse reasoning with
holding. See pp. 503, 505.
What the materials do well is provide a sense of the evolution of the doctrine and of the
problem of fitting it to the needs of an age in which territoriality has lost much, but by no means
all, of its holding power. The authors' apparent preference for a functional approach is certainly
understandable. It is not, however, the approach taken by the Supreme Court in its latest opinion on the subject. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Intl., 110 S.
Ct. 701, 705 (1990) ("The act of state doctrine is not some vague doctrine of abstention....").
That opinion will require revisions in the next edition. See pp. 513, 515, 546.
97. The authors recognize that the act of state doctrine has, at least historically, been based
in part on "choice of law considerations." P. 489. The domestic perspective may have again
assumed prominence with the Court's decision in Environmental Tectonics. See 110 S. Ct. at
704-07. Yet, a choice oflaw rationale for the doctrine is problematic. See Dellapenna, Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine, 35 VILL. L. REV. 1, 41-45 (1990).
Foreign sovereign immunity is an area where domestic analogs are obvious, and some of them
have been incorporated in federal legislation that, since 1976, has controlled in the area. See,
e.g., pp. 387-97 (discretionary functions exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a){5){A) (1988) drawn
from Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988)). Yet, it should not be assumed that
the doctrines of foreign sovereign immunity and of sovereign immunity have common parentage,
although today they appear to be shaped and justified by common rationales. See Hill, A Policy
Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 155 (1981).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 39-55.
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play, for it is in international law that one would expect to find an
attempt "to realize some underlying kind of justice." 100 Perhaps, that
is, international civil litigation should be a subfield within public international law. If so, International Civil Litigation, quite uncharacteristically, does not offer much help. 101 The authors may have assumed
that teachers and students would already be versed in public international law. Alternatively and more likely, they may simply have
yielded to a sense of practical limits on what a course can cover, relying on their readers' initiative to overcome ignorance in the book's
exhaustive literature references. Having made that effort I will approach the question through attention to two topics treated at length
and with sophistication in International Civil Litigation: service of
process and taking evidence abroad.
I conclude that one form of international law, custom, has only a
limited role to play in these areas and that most U.S. courts and commentators, as well as law reformers, have denied to it even that potential. Although I see a much greater role for treaties, even here the
potential has not been realized, and I argue that one need not look to
international law for a cure. The same disease afflicts us in international as in wholly domestic cases and law reform efforts: an unwillingness to surrender power, including by taking separation of powers
seriously, both when judges are deciding cases and when they are exercising delegated legislative power to make court rules.

A. Service of Process Abroad
Many law students learn little about service of process in their law
school procedure courses, where notwithstanding - or maybe because
of - Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "service" is
likely to be subordinated in discussion to the problem of jurisdiction.102 Litigators, of course, must learn the mechanics of service, but
as the authors point out (p. 120), what they learn in domestic cases
may ill equip them for the intricacies of international cases. Those
intricacies consequentially increase two risks associated with service of
process: (1) that effective service cannot be made within the time required by an applicable statute of limitations, and (2) that whatever
service is made will be deemed ineffective when the time comes to en100. See supra text accompanying note 9.
101. Chapter 1 includes three pages on the "Role of Public International Law." Pp. 12-14.
For students, I supplement that material with the Judicial Education on International Law Committee of the Section of International Law of the American Bar Association: Final Report, 24
INTL. LAW. 903 (1990).
102. FED. R. C!v. P. 4. Because Congress has so infrequently provided or authorized the
development of federal jurisdictional standards by statute, Rule 4 has played a major role in
defining the jurisdiction of federal courts, even in federal question cases. See Omni Capital Intl.
v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987) (state law governs, subject to due process restrictions
of fourteenth amendment, when service is made out of state under Rule 4(e) in federal question
case).
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force a domestic judgment abroad. The intricacies of service in international cases also increase its value to those who regard litigation as a
war of attrition. The authors pay little attention to the first risk (p.
148), perhaps because of their emphasis on service in federal actions
and the recent transmogrification of Rule 3 into a uniform tolling rule
in federal question cases. 103 They are, however, alert to problems of
expense and delay and to the risk that the temptation to mitigate them
may lead to the use of means of service unacceptable to a foreign court
in the enforcement context.104
What is missing here is a framework to ground both an understanding of the reasons why service of process continues to cause so
many problems in international cases and an understanding of approaches, whether in domestic or international law, that have promise
to resolve those problems. For these purposes, domestic learning may
not be simply inadequate; it may impede proper understanding.
Developments in the domestic law of service of process, spurred by
the needs of a highly mobile society and by the evolving jurisprudence
of federal constitutional controls on state court jurisdiction, have led
us to conceive of the function performed by process in terms of the
interests of the defendant in adequate notice and opportunity to defend.105 We have lost sight of the historic function of asserting the
state's power, indeed to such an extent that the Supreme Court's recent decision in the Burnham case, 106 arguably reflecting that historic
function and little more, may seem incoherent. 107 Concern for ex103. West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35 (1987); see Burbank, supra note 57, at 698-709. A "second
chance to comply with the Convention" (p. 148) will not save a litigant from the bar of a statute
of limitations that requires service rather than filing to stop the period. See Walker v. Armco
Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
104. Counsel must carefully consider the advantages and risks of different service mechanisms and select the mode of service (or combination thereof) best suited to the client's case.
This requires weighing the relative importance in particular cases of the often conflicting
goals of minimizing costs, ensuring foreign enforceability of any U.S. judgment, and accomplishing service promptly.
P. 127.
105. Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on
their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the territorial
jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way
to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see Carrington, supra note 64,
at 733-34.
106. Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (upholding general jurisdiction based on transitory presence of defendant in forum).
107. "The short of the matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes
due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due
process standard of 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Burnham, 110 S.
Ct. at 2115. Unfortunately, Justice Brennan's opinion concurring in the judgment is no more
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pense has led us further away from involvement of the state in the
process, 108 and impatience with what is seen as the strategic insistence
on formalities knows no international boundaries. 109
Not all countries share the American view of the limited role of
service of process (p. 131). Nor should this be surprising when one
recalls that elsewhere active involvement of the state (through the
judge) may reflect a normative view of litigation that is deeper than a
perceived caseload crisis, 110 that elsewhere a "foreign" defendant usually means one affiliated with another nation-state (and not one whose
courts are bound by the full faith and credit clause or an equivalent),
and that elsewhere people may not yet have come to regard litigation
as a fact, however unpleasant, of everyday life. 111
The authors of International Civil Litigation note that, even in the
recent past, service of process abroad in connection with U.S. civil
persuasive in arguing that the assertion of jurisdiction in Burnham was constitutionally reason·
able. See 110 S. Ct. at 2120-26 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Presumably not even the Justices who voted to uphold transient jurisdiction in Burnham
because of its "pedigree" alone, 110 S. Ct. at 2116, would sustain on that basis an exercise of
general jurisdiction over a foreign (including internationally foreign) corporate defendant based
only on service of an officer within the state. But see p. 42 (noting division among the few courts
that have considered the question). The Supreme Court long ago held that "U)urisdiction over 11
corporation of one State cannot be acquired in another State or district in which it has no place
of business and is not found, merely by serving process upon an executive officer temporarily
therein, even if he is there on business of the company." James-Dickinson Fann Mortgage Co. v.
Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 122 (1927).
108. Rule 4 was amended in 1983 largely to remove U.S. marshals from the role of process
servers and to permit greater use of service by mail. Pub. L. No. 97-462, § 2, 96 Stat. 2527
(codified as amended at FED. R. Clv. P. 4(c)(2)(A), (B); 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), (D), (E)).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 168-70.
110. Whether or not it is still "the view of most civil law countries[] that principal authority
for all judicial acts is and should be in the hands of public officials," Miller, International Cooper·

ation in Litigation Between the United States and Switzerland: Unilateral Procedural Accommodation in a Test Tube. 49 MINN. L. REV. 1069, 1132 n.203 (1965), the "public character of civil
procedure," as a result of which "the judge had to become an active participant, directing and
controlling the unfolding of the proceeding," has long been a characteristic of European civil law
systems. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 471 comment b (1987) ("Civil law states generally regard service of judicial process as a sover·
eign act that may be performed in their territory only by the state's own officials and in accord·
ance with its own law."); Cappelletti & Garth, Introduction -Policies, Trends and Ideas in Civil
Procedure, in XVI INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CoMPARATIVE LAW§ 1-19 (M. Cappelletti ed. 1984). See id. at§ 1-68. For descriptions of service in other countries, see, e.g., Kohl,
Romanist Legal Systems, in id. at § 6-94 (" 'service' of the act is governed by a formalism just as
strict as that governing its drafting. . . . The law assigns this task to a messenger of justice.•••");
Schima & Hoyer, Central European Countries, in id. at§ 6-139 ("Service of process is an act of
state and may, therefore, take place abroad only through the foreign authorities."); Wengerek,
Socialist Countries, in id. at § 6-215 ("In Socialist states it is axiomatic that procedural documents shall be served by an officer of the court, and not by the parties.") (footnote omitted); see
also infra note 111.
111. One reflection of this may be the requirement in some systems that a judge review the
complaint before it can be served. See Ekelof, Scandinavian Countries, in XVI INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 110, at§ 6-342; Schima & Hoyer, supra
note 110, at§ 6-137; Wengerek, supra note 110, at§§ 6-230 to 6-231; Vescovi, Iberian Peninsula
and Latin America, in id. at § 6-396.
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litigation has evoked diplomatic protests (p. 129). Moreover, although
the materials might suggest that the problem has been confined to the
context of administrative subpoenas and implicates only the question
of "enforcement jurisdiction" (pp. 128-31), the authors provide hints
that such is not the case (p. 125) and question any distinction between
"notice" and "compulsion" (p. 131). They do not provide, however,
sufficient information or perspective for evaluating the "[m]ajority
view of [the] effect on U.S. proceedings of service abroad in violation
of foreign law" {p. 128), which is that the violation is not grounds to
quash. The chapter would be well served by a section, necessarily general and comparative, that explores the service rules of foreign states
and the implications of customary international law.112
As the authors implicitly recognize, the best strategy to resolve the
conflicts undoubtedly consists in international service conventions,
two of which are included in appendices to the book {pp. 651-84), and
one of which, the Hague Service Convention, is explored in detail (pp.
136-60). Such conventions are a substitute for our full faith and credit
clause, mooting both choice of law and customary· international law
questions (which may not be independent) that can arise with respect
to service. They are not, of course, a perfect substitute. As the materials in International Civil Litigation make clear, problems of interpretation remain, about which there can be a difference of opinion within
one signatory state (pp. 156-60). Differences of opinion are more
likely between signatory states, because mutually agreed upon language masks fundamental assumptions about law and society that may
not derive from a shared tradition, 113 and no tribunal can impose a
uniform interpretation. But, as the materials also suggest (p. 142
n.97), not every conflicting interpretation requires litigation, and the
framework for dialogue that an international convention establishes perhaps its most enduring contribution - may help to resolve conflicts that stem not so much from ambiguous language as from differences in those fundamental assumptions.
Interpretation. and discussion, two forms of dialogue, do not exhaust the opportunities for accommodation either when a subject is
explicitly covered by an international convention or when it is not.
The conventions themselves inevitably present questions as to the
scope of their coverage, and even when their specific provisions are not
strictly applicable, they may still bear on the solution to the problem.
Domestic law may not be clear; customary international law often is
not. A convention may light the way to bringing the former in line
112. Compare the material on taking evidence abroad, discussed infra text accompanying
note 201.
113. This may be a problem even when there are shared traditions in general. See Collins,
The Hague Evidence Convention and Discovery: A Serious Misunderstanding?, 35 INTL. & COMP.
L.Q. 765 (1986).
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with the latter.114
In the Schlunk case, 115 the Supreme Court held that, although the
Hague Service Convention is mandatory when service of process must
be effected abroad in another signatory state, the internal law of the
forum (state or federal) alone determines whether in fact service must
be made abroad in order to be effective. Rejecting the view of three
concurring Justices that the Convention itself imposes a check on internal forum law, 116 the Court expressed doubt "that this country, or
any other country, will draft its internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the Convention in cases in which it would be appropriate to
transmit judicial documents for service abroad." 117 The Court also
found comfort in due process protection of foreign nationals and noted
practical considerations that are likely to prompt resort to the Convention even when it is not mandatory. 118
What the Court in Schlunk failed to appreciate, and what the concurring Justices imperfectly articulated, is that the Hague Service
Convention, as (self-executing) federal law supreme under the Constitution, 11 9 is deserving of no less respect than a federal statute. 120 It
thus requires interpretation sympathetic to the language, history, and
goals of the lawmaking enterprise, 121 and laws which are not of equal
114. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638-40 &
n.21 (1985) (reprinted and discussed at pp. 623-34); infra text accompanying notes 245-46. Treaties may also provide evidence of "agreed upon principles of international law." Kalamazoo
Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Govt. of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 427 (6th
Cir. 1984) (reprinted and discussed at pp. 547-54). But see Weisburd, Customary International
Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 1 (1988) (existence of treaties does
not justify ignoring state practice).
115. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988); pp. 152-54.
116. See 486 U.S. at 708-16 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
117. 486 U.S. at 705.
118. See 486 U.S. at 705-06.
119. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2. On treaties in general, see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE CoN511TUTION 129-71 (1972); Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10
MICH. J. INTL. L. 406 (1989). On the history of their inclusion in the Supremacy Clause, see
Holt, The Origins ofA/ienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 547, 551-52 (1989). Professor Gallant is intent to show that the interpretive position represented by the so-called Biden
condition (see 134 CoNG. REc. S6937 (daily ed. May 27, 1988)) - executive representations to
the Senate are binding - is not, pace Senator Biden and others, constitutionally compelled. See
Gallant, American Treaties, International Law: Treaty Interpretation After the Biden Condition,
21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1067 (1989). That may be a small point at which to stick. Historical research
by Jerome Marcus demonstrates that, in the early years of this country, the Senate had, or had
access to, the negotiating records of treaties. Marcus argues that senators could have such access
today and that recognition of a duty to review the negotiating record before advising and consenting is preferable to the position taken in the Biden condition, a position that invites dishonor
of our international obligations. Indeed, the Biden condition may be deemed inconsistent with
the Supremacy Clause, insofar as treaties were included to ensure that we honor those obligations. See J. Marcus, Some Historical Evidence on the Treaty Interpretation Debate (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with author).
120. See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884); Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
121. See, e.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 400-05 (1985); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S.
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dignity, state122 or federal, 123 should not be permitted to frustrate
either the meaning or the goals so identified. Whether the preferred
label is preemption or federal common law, 124 the idea should be clear.
The supremacy of federal law requires protection as much from evasion and distortion as it does from overt conflict, and the Constitution
is not the only federal law to be protected. 125 That, indeed, is the
message of the Rules of Decision Act, 126 which, we may forget, contemplates displacement of the "laws of the several states" not only by
"the Constitution" and "Acts of Congress," but also by "treaties of
the United States," and not only when those sources so "provide," but
when they so "require."
Of course, care must be taken both to ensure that state law is not
displaced lightly and that judges do not overstep their proper roles.
The latter concern explains the judicial preference for the preemption
label, 127 but neither concern is unique to the international c~ntext. Indeed, federalism concerns seem diminished in that context, because in
matters implicating this nation's foreign policy and foreign commerce,
the states act, if at all, only by federal sufferance. 12s
47, 51-58 (1929). For an amusing and convincing demonstration that Justice Scalia needs help in
his campaign to ban resort to "pre-ratification Senate materials for the interpretation of a treaty,"
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 376 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring), see Vagts, Senate
Materials and Treaty Interpretation: Some Research Hints for the Supreme Court, 83 AM. J.
INTL. L. 546 (1989).
122. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332
(1924); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); L. HENKIN, supra note 119, at 165-67.
123. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1933); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888); L. HENKIN, supra note 119, at 163-64. For an argument that international
law and treaties should have greater status than statutes, see L. HENKIN, supra note 119, at 42526.
124. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 807-10; Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12-13 n.69 (1975).
125. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 23031 (1942) ("state law must yield when it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions
of, a treaty"); Burbank, supra note 18, at 805-29.
126. "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in
civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1988). For a fully developed statement of my views about the role of the Rules of Decision Act
in authorizing and limiting federal common law, see Burbank, supra note 18, at 753-62, 764-71,
773-74, 787-97, 808-10, 816-17; see also Burbank, supra note 57, at 703-05. Professor Redish
now agrees with me. See Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process. An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761 (1989). However, he
continues to try to except "issues which are, in some sense, procedural," id. at 787 n.104, substituting one untenable evasion tactic for another. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 759 n.111.
127. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 807-10.
128. See L. HENKIN, supra note 119, at 227-48. This is not to say that federalism concerns
have been absent from the conduct of our foreign relations. See id. at 143-48. To the contrary,
historically they were prominent roadblocks, whether real or imagined, in our ability to enter
into treaties. See Jones, Intemational Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for
Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 561-62 (1953); Nadelmann, The United States Joins the Hague Conference on Private Intemational Law, 30 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 291, 291 (1965).
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Treaties may present a discrete set of concerns for preemption or
federal common law analysis from the perspective of separation of
powers. 129 Whatever their status in domestic law, treaties partake of
the nature of contracts. Although there need not be a quid pro quo or
consideration, typically there is. 130 If a court were to engage in a giveaway - to expand the scope of a treaty beyond that contemplated by
the treatymakers or to require the displacement of laws (state or federal) not reasonably deemed inconsistent with it - that action could
compromise the ability of those primarily charged with the conduct of
foreign relations effectively to implement our national interests
through dialogue with other nations. 131 This concern is not, however,
an excuse for abdication, particularly given the language of the Rules
of Decision Act and the reasons for including treaties in that statute
and in article Vl. 132 Rather, courts should take special care in determining what treaties "provide" and what they "require." If, contrary
to the Court's assurance in Schlunk, a state (versus "this country")
were to "draft its internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the
Convention," 133 there is both the power and the duty in the courts,
federal and state, to displace those laws.
Schlunk involved state law on service of process and law that, all
the Justices agreed, 134 was not fairly deemed hostile to or inconsistent
with the Hague Service Convention. When federal law is in direct
conflict with, or otherwise derogates from the obligations of, a treaty,
a different analysis applies. Subject to the mediating influences of judicial interpretation, a subsequently enacted federal statute controls. 135
Conversely, judge-made federal law is constrained by, and must be
129. For some this is not a difficulty peculiar to treaties. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domains, SO U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 540-44 (1983) (statutes as compromises).
130. See L. HENKIN, supra note 119, at 142-43; Oxman, supra note 35, at 760-61.
131. Cf Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 907 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting argument that United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement preempts state law and noting that such an interpretation would be anomalous in light of Congress' "concern with
achieving reciprocal trade barrier reduction"); supra text accompanying note 54 (potential of
judicial restraint in interpreting extraterritorial application of domestic legislation to undercut
Executive).
132. See supra note 119. Today, the costs of dishonoring our treaty obligations may not be as
obvious as they were in the late eighteenth century. See Holt, supra note 119. They are nonetheless to be reckoned with. For example, although aliens are protected by due process and thus
insulated to a very great extent from evasions of the Hague Service Convention, similar domestic
law protections may not be available to our nationals when sued in the courts of other signatory
states that follow the interpretation of the Convention given in Sch/unk.
133. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 705; see supra text accompanying note 117; cf Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 62, at 26-27 (discriminatory treatment of federal rights through alteration of state
law).
134. See Sch/unk, 486 U.S. at 708 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
135. See Edye v. Robinson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884); L. HENKIN,
supra note 119, at 163-64; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES§ 115 (1987). However well-established, the later-in-time rule is not without its
critics. See supra note 123.
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consistent with, applicable treaties. 13 6 What of other federal law, in
particular supervisory court rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
under the Rules Enabling Act? 137 Federal Rules have been at the
center of the stage of procedural reform since 1938. Their impact on
international cases is, therefore, critical to the inquiry.
Notwithstanding more than fifty years of cases and scholarly commentary to the contrary, the primary concern of those responsible for
drafting the Rules Enabling Act of 1934138 was finding appropriate
limits for the allocation of federal lawmaking power between the
Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress. The procedure/substance
dichotomy in the 1934 Act 139 was thus designed to serve separation of
powers values and only incidentally and derivatively to protect federalism values. It was designed to preserve for Congress certain prospective lawmaking choices and only incidentally and derivatively to
protect lawmaking choices, federal or state, already made. 140
Congress pulled together and amended the various statutory grants
of supervisory rulemaking power to the Supreme Court in 1988. 141
Although most attention to the legislation has focused on an unsuccessful attempt to repeal the so-called supersession clause, pursuant to
which Federal Rules trump previously enacted statutes with which
they are in conflict, 142 the legislative history reveals a determined effort to bring the rulemakers closer to the original understanding. 143
Whether under the original Enabling Act or its most recently
amended successor, Federal Rules relating to the manner of service do
not usually present problems of validity. Indeed, for precisely that
reason, the Supreme Court has twice used Rule 4 to extend the influence of the Rules into areas where they could not have influence di136. See Henkin, supra note 54, at 1563-64; Maier, supra note 44, at 473-76.
137. 28 u.s.c. §§ 2072-2074 (1988).
138. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064.
139. The Act provided in pertinent part:
Be it enacted, etc., That the Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to
prescribe by general rules, for the district courts of the United States • • . the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at
law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant. ...

Id.
140. See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1106-12
(1982).
141. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. lOQ..702, § 401, 102 Stat.
4642, 4648-50 (1988).
142. Compare Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989
DUKE L.J. 281 ("Supersession lives! Long live supersession!") with Burbank, Hold the Corks: A
Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989
DUKE L.J. 1012, 1014 n.6 ("I had thought of entitling this Comment, after Cafo the Elder,
'Supersession Must Be Destroyed.'"). According to 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988), "[a]ll laws in
conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect."
143. See Burbank, supra note 142, at 1029-36.
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rectly, both times involving limitations law, once in a diversity case 144
and once in a federal question case.145
Service of process abroad is not the usual case, or at least it was not
when Rule 4(i) 146 was added to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1963. The amendment was part of a comprehensive package of proposals developed by, or in close consultation with, the Commission on
International Rules of Judicial Procedure, which led not only to
changes in the Federal Rules but to federal legislation and a Uniform
Act. 147 The academics chiefly responsible for the work of the Commission 148 were impatient with foreign claims that service of process is
an official act and that unilateral service abroad abridges territorial
sovereignty, and even with objections to service made in violation of
local law. 149 In opting for a program of unilateral American reform,
these individuals were following, while attempting to justify, 150 the
time-honored American course of "leading" by example as a prelude,
if not in preference, to attempting to reach mutual understanding. 151
144. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); see Burbank, supra note 140, at 1173-76.
145. West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 38-39, 40 n.7 (1987); see Burbank, supra note 57, at 707·
08; Burbank, supra note 142, at 1022-26.
146. Pp. 123-27. Rule 4(i) ·Alternative Provisions for Service in a Foreign Country.
(1) Manner. When the federal or state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this rule authorizes service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district
court is held, and service is to be effected upon the party in a foreign country, it is also
sufficient if service of the summons and complaint is made: (A) in the manner prescribed by
the law of the foreign country for service in that country in an action in any of its courts of
general jurisdiction; or (B) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory, when service in either case is reasonably calculated to give actual notice; or (C) upon
an individual, by delivery to the individual personally, and upon a corporation or partner·
ship or association, by delivery to an officer, a managing or general agent; or (D) by any
form of mail, requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the
court to the party to be served; or (E) as directed by order of the court. Service under (C) or
(E) above may be made by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18 years of age
or who is designated by order of the district court or by the foreign court. On request, the
clerk shall deliver the summons to the plaintiff for transmission to the person or the foreign
court or officer who will make the service.
(2) Return. Proof of service may be made as prescribed by subdivision (g) of this rule, or by
the law of the foreign country, or by order of the court. When service is made pursuant to
subparagraph (l)(D) of this subdivision, proof of service shall include a receipt signed by the
addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to the court.
FED. R. Clv. P. 4(i).
147. See S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1964); Kaplan, Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-63 (I), 77 HARV. L. REV. 601, 635-37 (1964); Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 1015 (1965).
148. See Nadelmann, supra note 128, at 323.
149. See Kaplan, supra note 147, at 636-37; Smit, supra note 147, at 1017-19; Smit, Interna-

tional Co-Operation in Civil Litigation: Some Observations on the Roles ofInternational Law and
Reciprocity, 9 NETH. INTL. L. REV. 137 (1962). But see Miller, supra note 110, at 1072, 1075-86
(1965) (more sympathetic analysis of Swiss views).
150. See Kaplan, supra note 147, at 636; Miller, supra note 110, at 1131-32; Smit, supra note
147, at 1015-16, 1018-19, 1046.
151. Compare Jones, supra note 128, at 517, 556-62 (noting history of "judicial isolationism,"
often dressed up in federalism excuses, and need for dialogue) with Smit, supra note 147, at 1016
(unilateral domestic reform undertaken "on the view that internal reforms could obviate the need
for international regulation, but also on the notion that regulation by treaty might invade areas
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Framed so as "to allow accommodation to the policies and procedures of the foreign country," 152 Rule 4(i) nonetheless contemplates
service abroad that is valid "even if [made in a manner] forbidden by
the foreign country in which it was made." 153 Although the Reporter
thought that would be "an unhappy result," 154 the problem was
deemed primarily one of recognition of judgments. 155 Yet, as was
pointed out at the time, "[p]roblems of service of process raise questions of sovereignty in many foreign countries. They cannot be solved
unilaterally with disregard of the views of the local sovereign. Those
who speak of 'tenderness to the sensibilities of foreign nations' ...
should study the long list of diplomatic incidents." 156
Whether or not Rule 4(i) permits service in violation of customary
international law, it treats a matter that, in 1963 and today, implicates
the foreign policy and foreign trade interests of the United States. The
responsibility for such interests lies with the Executive and Congress.157 Federal Rules do not require the approval of Congress (but
see pp. 124, 129, 331), and even if the report and wait requirement of
the Enabling Act could theoretically or practically be equated with
approval, 158 the process by which Federal Rules become effective does
not involve the President. The rulemakers have no expertise in international law, and even if they did, they have no business making policy choices in an area of international sensitivity, whether or not the
policy choices actually made are consistent with customary internatraditionally covered by state law and thus was a subject to be approached with caution"). Smit
thus proved Jones a poor prophet. See Jones, supra note 128, at 562 ("It is doubtful that it would
be argued today that the benefits of procedural reform must be denied the state courts in the
international field, where the states themselves are powerless to act.") (footnote omitted).
152. FED. R. C1v. P. 4(i) advisory committee note.
153. Kaplan, supra note 147, at 637. For recent advocacy of such an approach, see Westbrook, Extraterritoriality, Conflict of Laws. and the Regulation of Transnational Business, 25
TEXAS INT'L L.J. 71, 96 (1990). For an extreme example of a mindset that would ignore foreign
law and the appropriate locus of power to make policy choices implicating this country's interests in foreign policy, see Smit, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: A Plea for Drastic
Surgery, 1980 AM. SocY. INTL. L. 49, 66 (1980) (criticizing as "improper" provision for service
of process in 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(3)(E), because of "the introduction ... of foreign law as governing our methods of service, deliberately avoided by the makers of Rule 4(i)").
154. Kaplan, supra note 147, at 637.
155. See id.
156. Nadelmann, supra note 128, at 310-11 n.141 (citing Kaplan, supra note 147, at 637); see
also Smit, supra note 147, at 1018 ("due regard for the sensibilities of foreign governments").
157. See generally L. HENKIN, supra note 119. For the role of the courts, see id. at 205-24.
"[W]hen the Supreme Court makes law through supervisory court rules, it is engaged in an
enterprise that, both practically and normatively, is different in important respects from the enterprise in which the Court, or any federal court, is engaged when it makes federal common
law." Burbank, supra note 142, at 1021.
158. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988), Federal Rules must be transmitted to Congress
not later than May 1 of the year in which they are to become effective and can take effect no
earlier than December 1. For a theoretical and practical critique of the view that this mechanism
is the equivalent of legislation, or at least of congressional "approval," see Burbank, supra note
140, at 1102, 1177-79, 1196 n.779.
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tional law. The best defense of Rule 4(i), other than the nontest of
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 159 is that it was part of an integrated package, some of which was passed by Congress and signed by the President, and all of which was specifically brought to Congress'
attention. 160
The same defense is not available for proposed amendments to
Rule 4 that were published for comment in the fall of 1989 161 and
revised without public notice in the summer of 1990, 162 and that are
currently pending before the Supreme Court for possible promulgation
and reporting to Congress. 163 These proposals do not fall under the
auspices of a broadly representative Commission, and they are not
part of a larger, including legislative, whole. 164 Moreover, not only
has this country entered into two international service conventions
since 1963, 165 but diplomatic protests have continued. 166 Both confirm the sensitivity of service abroad and the inappropriateness of lawmaking in the area at the instance of a self-described "committee of
159. 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (''The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them."); see Burbank, supra note
140, at 1028-1032, 1176-81.
160. See Smit, supra note 147. Indeed, provisions in the legislation passed as part of the
package included references to service under the Federal Rules. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1783, 1784
(1988); Smit, :fUpra note 147, at 1037-38.
161. See Preliminary Draft ofProposed Amendments to the Federal Rules ofAppellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 127 F.R.D. 237 (1989) [hereinafter Preliminary

Draft].
162. See Editor's Introduction, Intl. Lit. Newsletter, Aug. 1990, at 1; infra note 237.
163. See letter from L. Ralph Mecham to the Honorable, the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States (Nov. 19, 1990) (copy on file with author).
164. For a time it appeared that doubts about the Court's powers under the Enabling Act
would lead to submission of one of the proposals, providing in Rule 4 a federal amenability
standard for federal questions cases, for legislative action. See Carrington, supra note 64, at 744.
This notion was abandoned in the preliminary draft put out for comment, although a prefatory
note to the preliminary draft of amendments to Rule 4 made alternative recommendations in the
event Congress "disapproved" the proposed revision or did not disapprove it. Preliminary Draft,
supra note 161, 127 F.R.D. at 266. The author criticized the provision as beyond the Court's
powers under the Enabling Act. See letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure at 2-3 (Mar. 14, 1990) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Burbank
letter]. The proposed amendment to Rule 4 was drastically cut back, without public notice, to
provide a federal amenability standard in federal question cases only "over the person of any
defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state."
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments]. This does not solve the problem of rulemaking power, and it
raises a host of practical questions that are not answered in the Advisory Committee's Note. See
id. at 39-40. A "Special Note" contemplates that Congress may disapprove the provision and
recommends in any event that the rest of the rule be approved. See id. at 1.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13. Besides the Hague Service Convention, International Civil Litigation includes the Inter-American Convention on Letters Rogatory. Pp.
670-84.
166. See 1 B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL AssISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL)
69-71, 80-82 n.10 (1984).
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technicians." 167
One set of proposed amendments to Rule 4 involves a system for
waiver of service, implemented "through first-class mail or other reliable means" and backed up by cost-shifting if a defendant "fails to comply with the request [for waiver] ... unless good cause for the failure
be shown." The proposed waiver would not apply to objections to
venue or to personal jurisdiction, but the mechanism would be available with respect to all defendants (other than the United States, a
corporation of the United States, and infants or incompetents), wherever they may be found.16s
In a country where "the capias ad respondendum has given way to
personal service or other form of notice," 169 this mechanism would
make a great deal of sense, reducing incentives to impose unnecessary
expense and delay. 170 Its proposed extension from domestic cases to
cases where service would have to be effected abroad is, however,
problematic. The Advisory Committee reasons that "[b]ecause the
transmission of the waiver does not purport to effect service except by
consent, the transmission of a request for consent sent to a foreign
country gives no reasonable offense to foreign sovereignty, even to foreign governments that have withheld their assent to service by
mail."17 1 This reasoning is not persuasive.
As the Advisory Committee recognizes, the proposed waiver of
service mechanism is in fact a mechanism for defeasible service. With
Rule 4(i) on the books, it is no surprise that this aspect gave no pause.
One may question, however, whether a waiver is consensual if it was
executed with the awareness that sanctions172 would be imposed if it
was refused without "good cause" according to the notions of a foreign legal system. One may also question whether, in any event, a
private litigant has the power to consent to what her country regards
as an abrogation of territorial sovereignty. 173 Perhaps the Advisory
167. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose ofManifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism
of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067, 2076
(1989); see Burbank, supra note 56, at 1939 n.81.
168. Proposed Amendments, supra note 164, at 6-10.
169. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
170. See Carrington, supra note 64, at 736; Proposed Amendments, supra note 164, at 29-33.
171. Proposed Amendments, supra note 164, at 30.
172. "Openly stated, the principle is kin to that underlying recent changes in Rules 11 and
16." Carrington, supra note 64, at 736 (footnote omitted); see id. at 737 (noting that "costs of
formal service ... can be substantial"); infra note 183.
173. "Individual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual
can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected." Insurance Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982). If Switzerland
regards return receipt mail service as a violation of article 271 of the Swiss Penal Code, "which
prohibits anyone from committing an act in Switzerland on behalf of a foreign country 'that is a
matter of authority' without first obtaining the permission of the Swiss government,'' Miller,
supra note 110, at 1077; see id. at 1080 n.20, 1111, is it likely to take a different view of "a
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Committee is correct as a matter of customary international law, but
consideration of such questions suggests that both the Committee's
premise and its conclusion are debatable, especially if we imagine a
defendant who does not understand English. 174 We know that the
rulemakers have misjudged "foreign sensibilities" 175 in the past and
that judgments about "reasonable offense" are culturally contingent.176 Apart from existing service conventions, these judgments
should be made by Congress with participation by the President.
Moreover, the existence of service conventions not only suggests the
inappropriateness of the subject for court rulemaking, it raises a discrete and very troublesome question of rulemaking power. One of the
benefits of treaties, as we have seen, is that they can moot questions of
choice of law and of customary international law. 177 Does the Enabling Act vest the Supreme Court with the power to override a treaty
in court rules?
Some countries adhering to the Hague Service Convention do not
permit service by mail (pp. 155-60, 655-69). Indeed, whether a failure
to make a reservation with respect to article 10(a)178 of the Convention
procedure that effects economic service with cooperation of the defendant"? Proposed Amendments, supra note 164, at 26. See Report of the United States Delegation to the Special Commission on the Operation of the Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 17 INTL. L. MAT. 317 (1978)
("The Swiss and German observers indicated that no objection would be raised in their countries
if a copy of a legal document were mailed strictly for informational purposes, as long as no legal
consequences flow in the sending state from such mailing.").
In comments on the proposed waiver of service mechanism, one of the authors of International Civil Litigation predicted that "some civil law nations will object, perhaps vigorously, to
the waiver mechanism." Statement of Gary B. Born before the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, Chicago, Illinois, Feb. 2, 1990, at 24 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Born Statement]. He noted that some countries forbid "purely consensual, noncoercive foreign discovery
(e.g., depositions) on their territory, except under the supervision of their authorities,'' id. at 25
(footnote omitted), and that they would likely also regard waivers "as violations of local judicial
sovereignty." Id.; cf Oxman, supra note 35, at 740 n.16, 781 n.134 (private party may not waive
rights of a foreign state).
174. There is no requirement that the documents sent abroad be translated, but "[i]t would
..• be sufficient cause not to shift the cost of service if the defendant did not receive the request
or was insufficiently literate in English to understand it." Proposed Amendments, supra note 164,
at 30. See infra notes 182-83.
175. See supra text accompanying note 156.
176. Supra text accompanying notes 169-70; see Miller, supra note 110, at 1131-32; supra text
accompanying note 113.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 112-13. Professor Smit argued that
[t]he absence of an interest worthy of protection is demonstrated most clearly by the willing·
ness of the very same nations that object to the performance of foreign procedural acts
within their borders in the absence of a treaty to permit such acts as soon as they are covered by an international agreement.
Smit, supra note 147, at 1018 (footnote omitted). He seems to have neglected both the possibility
that an "international agreement" may contain a quid pro quo, see supra text accompanying note
130, and that, even if not, it may contain conditions, requirements, and procedures sufficient to
distinguish an exercise of power pursuant to its authority from a unilateral exercise of power.
More fundamentally, Professor Smit seems to have neglected the importance of consent in international law. See Weisburd, supra note 114, at 45-46.
178. "Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not
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constitutes consent to service by mail is a matter on which U.S. courts
are divided. 179 We know from dictum in Schlunk that the Convention
is mandatory when service must, as a matter of internal law, beeffected abroad. 180 The Court also asserted that we need not worry
about attempts to "draft ... internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the Convention." 181 Professor Carrington has assured us that the
extension of the proposed waiver of service mechanism to countries
that adhere to the Convention "is not intended to circumvent [it], but
to take proper account of the sensitivities offoreign sovereigns which are
properly expressed in that treaty." 182 Accepting his assurance, intentions are nonetheless irrelevant if the proposal is, as it appears to be,
inconsistent with the Convention. 183 If it is and if it were implemented
for service in signatory countries as a matter of state law, waiver of
service would be invalid because "state law must yield when it is ininterfere with - (a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to
persons abroad ..•." P. 652.
179. See pp. 155-60. Compare Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839 (2d Cir. 1986) (failure to make reservation under article lO(a) constitutes consent to service by mail) with Bankston
v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1989) (article lO(a) does not authorize
service of process, as opposed to transmittal of other documents). For a discussion of the diplomatic protests involving this issue, see 1 B. R.lsTAU, supra note 166, at 67-68, 148, 151.
180. See supra text accompanying note 115.
181. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 (1988); see supra text
accompanying note 117.
182. Carrington, supra note 64, at 749 n.108 (emphasis added). He thus recognized the risk
that it would be so regarded. See also id. at 737. Moreover, the use of the italicized language
recalls similar arguments by Professor Carrington's predecessors. See supra text accompanying
notes 156, 175.
In his comments on the proposed waiver mechanism, one of the authors of International Civil
Litigation predicted "that at least some states that are party to the Hague Service Convention
will view the waiver mechanism as a circumvention of the treaty," particularly because there is
no translation requirement. Born Statement, supra note 173, at 25 n.33.
183. Whether or not article lO(a) includes service of process, see supra note 179 and accompanying text, an article lO(a) reservation includes objection to the sending of ·~udicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad." P. 652. Do the rulemakers contend that
the proposed notice and request and/or the copy of the complaint which must accompany it are
not "judicial documents"? What of the information "by means of a text prescribed in an official
form promulgated pursuant to Rule 84"?
More generally, the cost-shifting mechanism in the proposed amendment may be deemed
inconsistent with article 12 of the Convention, pursuant to which "[t]he applicant shall pay or
reimburse the costs occasioned by - (a) the employment of a judicial officer or of a person
competent under the law of the state of destination, (b) the use of a particular method of service."
Pp. 652-53; see 1 B. RlsTAU, supra note 166, at 146-47.
Finally, the waiver proposal, including its cost-shifting mechanism, may be deemed inconsistent with the provision in article 5 of the Convention that "[s]ubject to sub-paragraph (b) of the
first paragraph of this article, the document may always be served by delivery to an addressee
who accepts it voluntarily." P. 652. Like the waiver proposal, "this method of service dispenses
with the translation requirements under Article 5(a) and does not give rise to any costs." 1 B.
R.lsTAU, supra 166, at 145. But unlike the waiver proposal, under article 5(a) the addressee "can
decline acceptance for any reason, including, of course, that the document is not in a language
which [she] understands," id. at 138, without fear of sanctions. See id. at 145 (criticizing this
country's practice of disregarding requests for "informal delivery," thereby "denying the addressee the opportunity of refusing to accept the document" afforded by foreign law).
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consistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty." 184 If
promulgated by the Supreme Court, and unless blocked by legislation,
however, the proposed waiver of service mechanism would become
part offederal law, and, under the Enabling Act, "[a]ll laws in conflict
with [it] shall be of no further force or effect after [it] ha[s] taken
effect. " 185
I will not here replay the debate about the wisdom and validity of
the supersession clause. 186 Suffice it to say that the prospect of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, not approved by Congress let alone by the
President, abrogating or subverting a treaty obligation of this country,
should give pause to even the staunchest defender of supersession.
Note, moreover, that the common avoidance technique of classifying
problems of supersession as problems of validity (of Federal Rules) 187
will not work given existing Rule 4(i), although the Supreme Court's
unwillingness to find any Federal Rule invalid reveals the technique as
pure rhetoric. 188 Note also that imputing a discrete procedure/substance dichotomy to the supersession clause, thereby preserving from
its purview laws that are "arguably substantive," 189 will not work
either, because presumably nobody thinks laws regulating the manner
of service fall within that category. The Hague Service Convention
may deal with matters of procedure, but they are hardly "procedural
marginalia" 190 of the sort that some claim are the object of the supersession clause. It manifests no disrespect for the federal courts as a
"'coequal' branch[] of the government" 191 to believe that they have
no more business subverting a treaty acting in a legislative mode than
they do when deciding cases or controversies.192
The Chief Justice has asserted to Congress that the "advisory committees should undertake to be circumspect in superseding procedural
statutes" and has assured Congress that the rulemakers "will undertake to identify such situations when they arise." 193 One would think
that treaties called for special circumspection, including in prejudging
the question of inconsistency and thus avoiding notice to Congress.
184. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942); see supra text accompanying notes
119-33.
185. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988); see supra note 142 and accompanying text.
186. See Burbank, supra note 142; Carrington, supra note 142.
187. See Burbank, supra note 142, at 1038.
188. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
189. Carrington, supra note 142, at 325. For criticism of this ingenious effort, see Burbank,
supra note 142, at 1036-39.
190. Carrington, supra note 142, at 324. But see Burbank, supra note 142, at 104345 (supersession was not originally nor is it today limited to such matters).
191. Carrington, supra note 142, at 324. But see Burbank, supra note 142, at 104546.
192. See Burbank, supra note 142, at 1046.
193. Letter from Hon. William H. Rehnquist to Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (Oct. 19, 1988),
reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. Hl0,441 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988); see Burbank, supra note 142, at
1038 n.163, 1040-41.
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Indeed, assuming the validity of the Enabling Act's supersession
clause, and hence the equivalence of Federal Rules and statutes, the
Chief Justice's promise is, with respect to treaties, a condition for supersession. Abrogation or modification of a treaty by a subsequently
enacted statute requires a clear expression of congressional purpose. 194
No superseding effect can properly be given to a Federal Rule that is
inconsistent with a treaty where such a purpose is not brought to the
attention of Congress, let alone denied by the rulemak.ers.
If the proposed use abroad of the waiver of service mechanism is
not a deliberate attempt "to circumvent the Convention," 19 5 it is difficult otherwise to regard another proposed amendment to Rule 4 that
is part of the same package. As originally put out for comment, the
provision would have permitted a district court, in a case governed by
the Convention (or other treaty), to direct service in a manner contrary to the Convention if service had not been effected within six
months of a request for assistance to a foreign govemment. 196 In comments submitted to the Advisory Committee, one of the authors of
International Civil Litigation suggested that the provision might conflict with the Hague Service Convention. 197 The provision has been
deleted. The proposed amendments before the Supreme Court, however, contain a provision that would authorize service
by whatever means may be directed by the court, including service by
means not authorized by international agreement or not consistent with
the law of a foreign country, if the court finds that internationally agreed
means or the law of a foreign country (A) will not provide a lawful
means by which service can be effected, or (B) in cases of urgency, will
not permit service within the time required by the circumstances. 198

The Advisory Committee Note reveals that the deletion was cosmetic only, that the new provision, like the old, is intended to authorize service "by means not authorized by international agreement or
not consistent with the law of a foreign country" when a Central Authority has failed "to effect service within the six month period provided by the Convention." 199 The new provision finds no greater
support for this proposition in article 15 of the Convention than did
the old. 200 We see again impatience with delay and an assertion by
194. See Transworld Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252-53 (1984); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S.
102, 120 (1933).
195. Supra note 182 and accompanying text.
196. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 161, 127 F.R.D. at 274.
197. See Born Statement, supra note 173, at 18-19.
198. Proposed Amendments, supra note 164, at 12-13.
199. Id. at 36.
200. See p. 653. According to the Advisory Committee, "Article 15 .•• provide[s] that
alternate methods may be used if a Central Authority does not respond within six months."
Proposed Amendments, supra note 164, at 35. I find no such authorization in the language of
article 15 and agree with Mr. Born that "[the six-month] period was probably intended to be
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technicians of the power, if not to override this country's treaty obligations, then to create a situation where conflict in interpretations is inevitable, all through a policy choice buried in drafting history.
B.

Taking Evidence Abroad

The materials on taking evidence abroad in International Civil Litigation (pp. 261-334) are very complete and very well organized.
Moreover, here the authors independently provide more information
and perspective for one interested in the comparative and international
law aspects of the problem. 2 01
The reader is alerted early to the fact that discovery abroad has
"produced some of the most contentious disputes that have arisen in
international civil litigation" (p. 261; see also pp. 265-66). The comparative information provided includes the insight that "[t]he comparatively restrictive scope of foreign discovery generally reflects
important foreign public policies, such as protection against unreasonable intrusion into personal privacy,"202 as well as the very practical
explanation that the inability to recover the costs of discovery in this
country, as p.ossible in many foreign systems, "aggravates displeasure
about intrusive and expensive U.S.-style discovery" (p. 265 n.22).
Although the authors refer to the possibility that unilateral extraterritorial discovery may violate customary international law (pp. 265,
278) and raise questions of power to proceed in violation of foreign
law (pp. 291-92), they do not clearly distinguish between the two. Perhaps that is because the foreign diplomatic protests reported by the
authors (p. 279) have not made such distinctions, 203 and because to a
considerable extent the questions merge, as for example where discovery must be conducted under the supervision of a judge under foreign
law.
Still, it would be useful to know how it is that our courts came to
confined to cases involving default judgments against defendants who evade service." Born
Statement, supra note 173, at 19. Article 15 seems exclusively directed toward default judgments
and not to authorize "alternative non-treaty methods of service,'' Carrington, supra note 64, at
749, unless, as is most unlikely, "any provisional or protective measure" includes service. See I
B. RlsTAU, supra note 166, at 173 ("Thus, the Convention does not intend to change the internal
laws of the contracting states to the extent that they may permit the entry of temporary restraining orders, sequestration orders, or attachments of property ex parte. "); cf. FED. R. C1v. P,
64 (seizure of person or property); 65 (injunctions).
Because the rulemakers have denied any inconsistency and hence any purpose to supersede
the Hague Service Convention, if a court subsequently disagrees, the Convention controls. See
supra text accompanying note 194.
201. See supra text accompanying note 112.
202. P. 265; cf. Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2242-44 (1989) (social costs in violation of principle of
privacy).
203. See Onkelinx, Conflict of International Jurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Documents in Violation of the Law of the Situs, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 487, 499-500 (1969) (protests not
clearly distinguishing between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction).

May 1991]

International Civil Litigation

1491

"prefer[] the more familiar expeditious avenue of direct discovery" (p.
266) from foreigners over whom they have jurisdiction, and whence
their authority to implement that preference derives. 204 Are there pertinent Supreme Court decisions involving foreign parties before the
Rogers case2°5 and decisions, moreover, that did not involve blocking
statutes (pp. 282-83)? To what extent are the authorities relied on for
the existence of power cases involving statutes that authorize the issuance of subpoenas or, more generally, public law cases? In that regard, Rogers is instinct with concern for "the policies underlying the
Trading with the Enemy Act" (p. 286), and the Court made clear that
it was affirming the production order in that case as a legitimate "accommodation of the Rule [Rule 34] ... to the policies underlying the
Trading with the Enemy Act." 206
I suspect (but do not know) that full investigation of these questions might reveal something at work that we have already seen in
domestic and international civil litigation: the generalization of a rule
from specific substantive contexts to all substantive contexts. 207 In
any event, the materials in International Civil Litigation reveal other
phenomena that we have seen elsewhere. First, as with service of process, our approach to taking evidence abroad has been one of coming
to the international bargaining table only after staking out an aggressively self-regarding position.208 Second, as with legislative jurisdiction,209 in the absence of agreement about the requirements of
204. The authors point out:
U.S. law had historically showed greater deference to the laws of the place where discovery
was to be ordered. See REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CoNFLICT OF LAWS§ 94 (1934) ("[a]
state can exercise jurisdiction through its courts to make a decree directing a party subject to
the jurisdiction of the court to do an act in another state, provided such act is not contrary
to the law of the state in which it is to be performed"); lngs v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d
Cir. 1960) (refusing to order production of documents located in Canada because this would
arguably violate Quebec law); SEC v. Minas De Artemesia, S.A., 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir.
1945) (refusing to enforce subpoena for production of documents located in Mexico when
this would violate Mexican law).
P. 291.
205. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197 (1958) (reprinted at pp. 284-89).
206. P. 287; see Onkelinx, supra note 203, at 510-13.
207. If so, the culprits are likely to be the Federal Rules themselves, see supra text accompanying notes 56-60; infra text accompanying note 223, and REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws § 53 (1971) (judicial jurisdiction over a person entails power to order that person
"to do an act, or to refrain from doing an act, in another state"). For criticism of this provision,
see Onkelinx, supra note 203, at 495-96.
208. See pp. 309-10; supra text accompanying notes 146-56; Smit, supra note 149; Smit,
International Aspects of Federal Civil Procedure, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1031, 1056-58 (1961). It
comes as no surprise that Professor Smit has recently called on the United States to renounce
adherence to the Hague Service and Hague Evidence Conventions, objecting to both as more
cumbersome than domestic law and attempting to persuade his audience that they do not offer
much if anything to a foreigner that internal U.S. law does not afford. See Smit, Les Conflicts de
Jurisdiction au Procedure Civile, 1990 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE, No. 3,
872.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 14-55.
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customary international law, it has fallen to the courts to exercise selfrestraint, and the techniques they have been encouraged to use are
borrowed from domestic conflicts law. 210 Third and most important,
both the Supreme Court and its advisers on Federal Rules have
demonstrated inadequate respect for the only form of international
lawmaking that has real promise in international civil litigation.211
This is not the occasion for a lengthy critique of the Supreme
Court's opinions in the Aerospatiale case, interpreting the Hague Evidence Convention. 212 A question that has occupied many commentators and that interests the authors of International Civil Litigation is
whether a rule requiring first resort to the Convention for pretrial discovery, advocated by four members of the Court,213 is a preferable
interpretation of the Convention, and better serves the interests of the
international community, than the ad hoc comity analysis blessed by
the majority. 214 That is the wrong question if, as Lawrence Collins
has concluded:
First, the Hague Evidence Convention was intended primarily to apply
to "evidence" in the sense of material required to prove or disprove allegations at trial. It was not intended to apply to discovery in the sense of
the search for material which might lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence. Second, there was some concern at the Hague Conference that
United States litigants might endeavour to use the Convention for third
party discovery, and Article 23 was inserted as an attempt {perhaps only
partially successful in drafting terms) to make it clear that there was no
obligation on Contracting States to allow the Convention to be used for
third party discovery. This is so whether the discovery is of documents
or by way of oral deposition. Third, there is no reason whatsoever to
believe that the Convention was ever intended to apply to normal inter
partes discovery, and not even the attempts of successive US delegations
from 1978 onwards to encourage the use of the Convention for discovery
appear to have envisaged anything other than third party discovery. 215

If Collins is right, it would appear that the U.S. has refined the art
of unilateral international lawmaking. 216 And if he is right, then so
was the Supreme Court in its conclusion that the Hague Evidence
Convention does not limit the power of a United States court to order
210. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES§ 40 (1965) (p. 299); REsrATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 442 (1987) (pp. 303-04); Onkelinx, supra note 203, at 500-01; supra note
46.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 119-33, 175-200.
212. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522
(1987) (reprinted at pp. 320-28). The Convention itself is set forth at pp. 685·94, and the declarations concerning it at pp. 695-713.
213. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 547-68 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
214. See pp. 319, 328-34; Born & Hoing, Comity and the Lower Courts: Post-Aerospatiale
Applications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 INTL. LAW. 393 (1990).
215. Collins, supra note 113, at 783.
216. See id. at 781-82.
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discovery from a foreign party over whom it has jurisdiction.217 That
would, however, be a fortuity. In rejecting a first resort rule, 218 the
majority again failed to give a treaty the respect due an ordinary federal statute. Rather, having concluded that the Convention does not
explicitly provide such a rule, the majority declined to' analyze its
power to create one. 219 Moreover, having considered the policies animating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 220 the majority focused
only on what the Convention provides and on the requirements of international comity rather than those of the Convention. 221
There is a risk of misunderstanding my claim that the Court in
Aerospatiale "failed to give a treaty the respect due an ordinary federal
statute." That is, I believe, true in the sense that the Court failed, as it
did in Schlunk, seriously to engage the policies animating the Convention and to consider the interpretive or federal common law rules they
might reasonably be thought to require. 222 In fact, however, the Court
217. See id. at 784-85.
218. See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 533-40.
219. See 482 U.S. at 542.
220. "A rule of first resort in all cases would ... be inconsistent with the overriding interest
in the ~ust, speedy, and inexpensive determination' of litigation in our courts. See FED. RULE
Civ. P. 1." Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 542-43; see also 482 U.S. at 534 n.16 (noting existence of
FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) at time Convention was drafted).
221. See 482 U.S. at 543-46. "If such a duty were to be inferred from the adoption of the
Convention itself, we believe it would have been described in the text of that document." 482
U.S. at 543. But see Oxman, supra note 35, at 761 & n.77, 787-90 n.150 (suggesting a federal
common law rule of first resort).
In an interesting article that explores the application of Aerospatiale in state courts, the authors of International Civil Litigation recognize that the Court "rested its decision [not] on an
interpretation of the Convention ... [but] on the broader doctrine of 'international comity.' "
Westin & Born, supra note 4, at 297; see id. at 301 n.20. If that is true, however, how can the
federal common law they see emerging from the decision be explained in terms "of ensuring that
concessions made by the federal government to foreign sovereign interests are honored"? Id. at
307. The problem may derive, in part, from the authors' failure firmly to grasp the dual nature of
the inquiry under traditional federal common law analysis, see Burbank, supra note 18, at 758,
which by the way fully supports theit conclusion. State discovery procedures govern in state
court unless they are "preempted.'' Preemption can take two forms - displacement by uniform
federal rules or displacement only of state rules that are hostile to or inconsistent with federal
interests. See id. 808-10; Westin & Born, supra note 4, at 308.
The problem identified here also occurs in the authors' treatment of federal common law in
International Civil Litigation. Their conception of federal common law tends to be black and
white - either state law applies or uniform federal law governs. See pp. 589-90. By failing to
recognize that under traditional federal common law analysis, as under a Rules of Decision Act
approach, see supra note 126, there is another possibility, the authors do not capitalize on their
observation, with respect to recognition of judgments, that "there are surprisingly few fundamental differences in the approaches taken by the various states.'' P. 565. If that is true, it offers one
argument against the need for "a uniform nationwide standard.'' P. 564. There is, however,
federal power, including perhaps federal judicial power, to displace any state rule that is hostile
to or inconsistent with federal interests. See also pp. 185-88 (forum selection agreements); pp.
216-17 & 227-30 (forum non conveniens); p. 504 (act of state doctrine).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 119-33; cf. Maier, Extraterritorial Discovery: Cooperation, Coercion and the Hague Evidence Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 239, 260
(1986) ("the Convention's terms, arrived at through the negotiation process, are necessarily the
best evidence of the balanced interests of the signatories").
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treated the Convention very much like "an ordinary federal statute"
with respect to its relationship to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In domestic cases, the Court strains to avoid any inconsistency between the Federal Rules and subsequently enacted statutes, reasoning
that Congress legislates against the background of those rules and requiring clear evidence of an intent to displace any one of them in a
specific substantive context.223 Whatever the factual basis for, or normative soundness of, this interpretive rule in domestic cases,224 it is
inimical to international law reform in procedure through bilateral or
multilateral conventions. 22s
In light of the doubts harbored by the majority in Aerospatiale
about the Court's power to fashion a common law rule of first resort
under the Hague Evidence Convention226 - doubts that I believe are
misplaced227 - it may come as a surprise that the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules published for comment a proposed amendment to
Rule 26 that would have accomplished the same thing. The proposal
would have required resort to an "applicable treaty or convention" in
the case of discovery abroad, preserving discovery under the Federal
Rules "if discovery conducted by such methods [was] inadequate or
inequitable and additional discovery [was] not prohibited by the treaty
or convention."228
On the merits, there is much to be said for this proposal, which
preferred Justice Blackmun's separate opinion in Aerospatiale 229 to the
opinion for the Court, although the comity it trumpeted might have
been more apparent than real. 230 As Justice Blackmun pointed out,
however, "foreign legal systems and foreign interests are implicated,"231 and the Hague "Convention represents a political determination - one that, consistent with the principle of separation of
powers, courts should not attempt to second-guess." 232 A Federal
Rule promulgated under the Enabling Act is not a statute, both be223. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 698-701 (1979); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co.,
807 F.2d 1000, 1006-11 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987); Burbank, supra note
142, at 1044-45. The authors of International Civil Litigation observe that "in the area of judicial
cooperation, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted treaties providing mechanisms for extraterritorial discovery and service to avoid displacing existing U.S. discovery and service rules."
P. 14 n.72.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
225. The notion that domestic interests expressed in court rules are "overriding" in the context of interpreting a treaty, see supra note 220, could also cripple the process of concluding
international agreements.
226. See supra text accompanying note 219.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 119-33; note 222.
228. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 161, 127 F.R.D. at 318.
229. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
230. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 161, 127 F.R.D. at 320-21.
231. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 551-52 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
232. 482 U.S. at 552.
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cause it is not passed by Congress and because it is not signed by the
President. 233 It makes no difference whether the vehicle of "secondguessing" is common law or court rule. Moreover, it makes no difference that the content of a proposed rule is deemed to advance international comity. Once the Supreme Court has authoritatively
interpreted a treaty, the matter is for Congress and the President.
These objections were made to the Advisory Committee,234 and,
for whatever reason, the proposed amendment to Rule 26 that is
before the Supreme Court is not the proposed amendment that was
published for comment. Unfortunately, the current text235 and its associated Advisory Committee Note236 are not a model of clarity. As
has been noted by one of the authors of International Civil Litigation,
they suggest power to authorize "discovery on foreign territory in violation of foreign law." 237 Even if not contrary to customary intemational law,238 the exercise of such power could cause an international
incident. In addition, the proposed amendment might be interpreted
to supersede Aerospatiale, and hence the interpretation of the Hague
Evidence Convention therein, by making a comity analysis wholly discretionary in the case of discovery from parties and persons controlled
by parties. 239 The new proposal is no more valid than the one it replaced, and the drafting history can only enhance suspicion that the
rulemakers are out of their depth when dealing with international civil
procedure. At the least, the experience should confirm the wisdom of
233. See supra text accompanying note 158.
234. See Burbank letter, supra note 164, at 4-5.
235. In the current text, Rule 26(a) includes the following proposed amendment: "Discovery
at a place within a country having a treaty with the United States applicable to such discovery shall
be conducted by methods authorized by the treaty unless the court determines that those methods are inadequate or inequitable and authorizes other discovery methods not prohibited by the
treaty." Proposed Amendments, supra note 164, at 56 (emphasis added).
236. See id. at 57-58.
237. In a remarkable and unpublicized reversal, the Committee now plans to propose a
wholly different amendment to Rule 26(a). The new amendment would require use of the
Convention (subject to an "inequity or inadequacy" exception) only where discovery would
physically occur on foreign territory - such as plant inspection or deposition. This amendment wholly abandons the concurring opinion in Aerospatiale. and indeed appears to contemplate U.S.-ordered depositions on foreign territory in violation of foreign law. While
district judges generally can be counted on to avoid such a result, as they have unanimously
done so to date, the Committee's latest proposal is an unfortunate development.
Editor's Introduction, Intl. Litig. Newsletter, Aug. 199.0, at 1.
238. But see Onkelinx, supra note 203, at 496-500; Gerber, International Discovery After Aerospatiale: The Quest for an Analytical Framework, 82 AM. J. INTL. L. 521, 534-39 (1988). In a
recent article on the proposed amendment, one of the authors of International Civil Litigation
argues that "[w]hat the Committee has proposed would be an unequivocal violation of international law." Born, Fishing For Trouble in Foreign Depths, Legal Times, Apr. 8, 1991, at 30.
239. Compare Proposed Amendments, supra note 164, at 57 ("However, comity may be employed in matters to which the requirement of the rule does not apply. Cf. Societe Nationale
...") with Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 ("prior scrutiny in each case of the particular facts,
sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to those procedures will prove effective") (footnote
omitted}.
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following rulemaking procedures that would have brought the substantive problems to light.240
The recent history of federal regulation of service of process and
taking evidence abroad is thus one of unilateral efforts to bring the rest
of the world to see it our way, with attempts to reach mutual understanding coming only after we staked out our positions. Those positions included a refusal to take seriously appeals to customary
international law that did not accord with our views regarding the role
of courts and litigation, and regarding territorial sovereignty. Moreover, the primary attempts to reach mutual understanding that we
have made in these areas, the Hague Service and Evidence Conventions, have been treated with less dignity than a garden variety federal
statute by the Supreme Court, and they now are being treated with no
more dignity by those responsible for proposing amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The history alone suggests that customary international law can
have only a walk-on part in this play. Given the controversy that has
attended recent attempts to impute consequential restraining force to
customary international law when sovereign interests, and therefore
the traditional concerns of public international law, are much more
apparent, 241 that is not surprising.
Indeed, to a newcomer who approaches these matters from a domestic perspective, it may not be clear whether customary international law should have a significant (i.e., nonsupporting) role in our
courts, in this or any other play.242 Recent historical scholarship may
cause her to question hoary statements about the "law of nations" as
part of our law, 243 at least to question how it is that one branch of the
"law of nations" 244 and one alone escaped the domesticating discipline
240. Part I,§ 5(a) of the Procedures for the Conduct of Business by the Judicial Conference
Committees on Rules of Practice and Procedure provides that "[i]f the Advisory Committee
makes any substantial change, an additional period for public notice and comment may be provided." Preliminary Draft, supra note 161, 127 F.R.D. at 244. Part II,§ 8(c) of the Procedures
provides that "[i]f a modification [made by the Standing Committee] effects a substantial change,
the proposal will be returned to the Advisory Committee with appropriate instructions." Id. at

246.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 42-55.
242. See Trimble, supra note 47, passim; supra note 54. One could, of course, conclude that,
although customary international law has no directly binding force in our courts, it may inform
the content of federal law that the courts are authorized to make or apply.
243. See Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 V AND. L. REV.
819 (1989); Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205
(1988). Recent developments in the Middle East give special pungency to Professor Jay's conclusion that "[f]rom the very first years of the country, the law of nations has served more as a
source of executive power than as a limitation on it." Jay, supra, at 848.
244. See Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789:
The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1513 (1984); Jay, supra note 243, at 83233.
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of the positivist revolution. 245 Other recent scholarship adds to these
historical inquiries questions about legitimacy and competence.246 But
these are questions for another day.
Treaties, on the other hand, have a potentially significant role to
play in international civil litigation. I have tried to demonstrate, however, that in interpreting treaties our courts need not resort to principles of "some underlying kind of justice" 247 characteristic of a discrete
field, and in particular that they do not need to resort to international
law to interpret this kind of international lawmaking.248 On the contrary, in the process of interpretation treaties require the same sympathetic respect, including respect for lawmaking compromises, that is
due a federal statute. Whether subsequent lawmaking takes the form
of federal common law or federal court rulemaking, the respect due is
for lawmaking choices made through a process specially prescribed by
our Constitution, one in which the President plays a special role.
Notwithstanding Schlunk and Aerospatiale, there may be reason for
hope. In another recent decision interpreting a treaty on matters of
international civil procedure (agreements to arbitrate), the Court manifested both unwillingness "to subvert the spirit of the United States'
accession" 249 and willingness "to subordinate domestic notions. " 250
Perhaps, however, the Court's schizophrenic approach to treaties is
simply a function of calculations about when it is in the judiciary's
interest to share power.

IV.

CONCLUSION

My doubts that there is or soon can be "a distinct, cohesive body
of law" (p. 1) in international civil litigation or that the themes identified by the authors of International Civil Litigation warrant treatment
of the topics they cover as a discrete field251 should not be permitted to
obscure the great strengths of this book. The increasing importance of
245. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 761 n.121; Jay, supra note 243, at 830-33; Maier, supra
note 44, at 460-63.
246. See Maier, supra note 44, at 468-76; Trimble, supra note 47, at 707-32.
247. See supra text accompanying note 9.
248. The United States is not a party to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
See J. SWEENEY,
OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 237 n.a (3d
ed. Doc. Supp. 1988).
249. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639-40 n.21
(1985); see Maier, supra note 222, at 257.
250. 473 U.S. at 639.
251. Nor am I persuaded that we would be well served by following Professor Westbrook's
prescription to abandon personal jurisdiction, international conflict of laws, act of state and sovereign immunity and recast them "within the framework of common policies and goals directed
to fair, humane, and efficient regulation of business." Westbrook, supra note 153, at 76. Criticizing domestic doctrine as insufficiently attentive to international dimensions neglects the fact that
much of that doctrine was first drawn from, or influenced by, international cases and treatises.
See supra text accompanying notes 11-13, 56-95. Current doctrine in the five areas may be a
mess, but it is inconceivable to me that obliterating the lines among them and subjecting all to a

c.
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international trade to our economy and the consequent increase in international litigation in our courts require lawyers who are equipped
to meet the special demands that such litigation imposes. International Civil Litigation exposes those special demands with a degree of
clarity, thoroughness, and sophistication that is unusual, let alone at
the hands of those whose primary concern is the practice of law.
Moreover, as this review may suggest, the materials challenge students, scholars, and practitioners to reflect upon opportunities for international cooperation and accommodation that have been missed in
the past and on means to enhance cooperation and accommodation in
the future.
The study of procedure is, or should be, a study in power. 252 International Civil Litigation demonstrates that issues of power are no less
important in the international than in the domestic sphere and that
they are not confined to areas with obvious substantive implications. 253 Moreover, the history of domestic regulation of international
procedure demonstrates that, however far from the surface the substantive implications lie, the major concern is, or should be, separation
of powers, rather than federalism. 254 But there is nothing new in that
or in the refusal of the federal courts to acknowledge it. 255

multifactored analysis would be an improvement. Compare supra text accompanying note 82
(personal jurisdiction).
252. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 1, at 1471-76.
253. For one such area, see supra text accompanying notes 14-55 (legislative jurisdiction); see
also Burbank, supra note 57, at 714 ("'real procedure' is hard to find").
254. See supra text accompanying notes 102-200 (service of process abroad), 201-240 (taking
evidence abroad).
255. See Burbank, supra note 18, at 755-62; Burbank, supra note 140, at 1185-97. Although
the Supreme Court's recent decision upholding a Rule 11 sanction imposed on a represented
client against a challenge under the Rules Enabling Act might be viewed as a simple reaffirmation of past cases gutting that statute, see Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communication
Enterprises, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922, 933-34 (1991), two aspects of the decision are noteworthy.
First, the Court was at pains to reiterate that Rule 11 is not a fee-shifting provision. See 111 S.
Ct. at 934. Second, three members of the Court saw serious problems under the Enabling Act,
and they voiced "concerns with respect to both separation of powers and federalism." 111 S. Ct.
at 940 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This is progress.

